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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARRIE JOHNSON, ] 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. ] 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, ] 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee. ] 
) Priority 15 
) Case No. 981484-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
Statement of Issues Presented by Appellant 
and Standard of Review for Issues Presented by Appellant 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Carrie Johnson, hereinafter called, "Wife," notes that 
Appellant ("Husband") has not cited the record for preservation of his issues. Wife 
generally agrees that Husband's issues are governed by an "abuse of discretion" 
standard of review, with the adequacy of findings regarding attorney's fees governed 
by a "correctness" standard. Conclusions of law regarding alimony awards are 
reviewed for correctness, but findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are 
"clearly erroneous." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996) 
Statement of Issues Presented By Cross-Appellant; 
Preservation of Issues and Standards of Review 
Wife presents the following issues for this Court's review: 
1. Did the trial court err in finding Wife in contempt of court for 
denying Husband's visitation where the issue of any alleged contempt was never raised 
by affidavit nor identified in the pre-trial order and there was no evidence whatsoever 
of contempt on Wife's part? Issue preserved at R. 378-379, R. 579, p. 21-22. Where 
the issue was not raised by affidavit and prior notice, review is for correctness. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to consider evidence which showed 
that Husband's earnings vastly exceeded deposits to his VA credit union accounts 
thereby err in rulings regarding child support, alimony and private schooling? Issue 
preserved at evidence cited at Facts fl 11-23, infra.9 and at R. 294-299, R. 376-377. 
A trial court's determination will be reversed if the ruling is so unreasonable that it 
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. 
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993). 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to consider the tax implications of its 
alimony award, in imputing income to Wife without considering her need for 
rehabilitation alimony, and in only awarding Wife "a minimum of five years" of non-
terminable reimbursement alimony? Issues preserved in evidence at Facts t1 1-41, 
infra., and R 580, p. 168; R 581, p.294-299; R. 376-377. These matters are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Kunzler at 275. 
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4. Did the trial court err in not ordering Husband to provide security for 
payment of alimony and child support? Issue reserved at R 580, p. 181-183, 195 ; R. 
301-302, 378. This matter is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Kunzler at 275. 
5. Did the trial court err in not awarding Wife all of her attorney's 
fees? (R 581, p. 441; R. 319-355) This matter is reviewed for correctness as to 
adequacy of findings. Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-69 (Utah App. 
1996). Failure to award all attorney's fees when evidence undisputed is an abuse of 
discretion. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991). 
6. Should Wife be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal? When a 
spouse prevails on the main issue on appeal in a divorce action she will normally be 
awarded attorney's fees to be determined by the trial court on remand. Bell at 494. 
Determinative Authorities 
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. See Exhibit A of Addendum. 
Title 62A-11-321, Utah Code Annotated. See Exhibit A of Addendum. 
Title 62A-11-303(18), Utah Code Annotated. See Exhibit A of Addendum. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of Case. This is an appeal from the original divorce trial in 
the above matter. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Wife accepts 
Husband's statement of the proceedings. 
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court. Wife accepts Husband's statement of 
disposition but adds the following information. The trial court held Wife in contempt, 
without prior notice and without evidence, for allegedly interfering with Husband's 
visitation. (R 373, 481, 493, 579 p. 21-22) The trial court held Husband in contempt 
for refusing to pay support but denied Wife's request that Husband post security for 
payment of support. (R 301-302, 378, 579 p. 20-21, 580 p. 194-195) 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. Wife and Husband first met in 1983 when the parties were both sophomores 
at Brigham Young University. Wife was an English major and Husband was studying 
Zoology. (T 72)l Wife's goal was to obtain an English degree and to teach secondary 
education. (T 73; PI Exhibit 1) Husband's goal was unclear and he was on academic 
probation. (T 72) The parties married on June 22, 1984. (T 71) 
2. After the parties married Husband attended community college to 
rehabilitate his grades and then returned to BYU. (T 73) During this time it was 
decided that Husband would become a podiatrist. (T 73) Wife had only worked 
occasional jobs before attending BYU. (T 78) Wife worked as a data base entry clerk 
and cleaned apartments while the parties attended BYU. Husband worked off and on. 
(T 75, 78, 95, 320; PI Exhibits 1, 7, 8) 
3. Wife attended classes for Husband. (T 335) To overcome Husband's poor 
References to trial transcripts are noted with capital "T" followed by page. 
References to the record are noted with capital "R" followed by page. The two volumes 
of the trial transcripts are at R 580 and R 581. 
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grades and improve Husband's chances of getting into podiatry school, Wife and 
Husband also worked together as County Crisis Line volunteers. (T 77, 83-84; PI 
Exhibit 1, PI Exhibit 5 p. 5) Wife had learned of the Crisis Line opportunity through 
her employment as a research assistant to BYU Professor B.K. Harrison whose son 
had used this route to get into medical school. (T 77, 315; PI Exhibit 1) Wife 
prepared the application which resulted in Husband receiving a BYU service award on 
the basis of their volunteer work. (T 84: PI Exhibit 5 p. 5) 
4. While at BYU the parties lived rent-free in a home owned by Husband's 
grandmother. They maintained the property and managed a rented basement 
apartment, receiving the rent. (T 74) Wife received a $10,000 inheritance from her 
grandfather. $1,500 was used to buy engines for Husband's vehicles shortly before 
the parties married and $8,000 was used after marriage for living expenses and 
tuition. (T 123, 314) 
Podiatry College and Wife's Career Change 
5. Both parties graduated from BYU in August, 1987. (T 75) Wife had 
completed her student teaching practicum and received her 3 year Utah teaching 
certificate. (T 76-77) However, Wife gave up her teaching career to move to 
Northern California for Husband to attend the California College of Podiatric 
Medicine. (T 76) The parties decided that Wife would instead manage Husband's 
podiatry practice when he graduated. (T 79-80) To this end Wife accepted full time 
employment with Dr. Wolpa at his Berkeley Foot Clinic while Husband was in 
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podiatry college. Wife started at the rate of $1,500 per month and received raises 
each year. (T 96-97) Husband did little work during the first year of podiatry 
college (1987-88) and did just a few "odd jobs" before he graduated in May 1991. (T 
81-2, 86; PI Exhibits 3, 8) Husband earned about $1,000 in 1988 and about $2,000 in 
1989. (T 191) For 1990 the parties had joint income of $24,868, with $21,337 being 
earned by Wife. (PI Exhibit 9) Wife and Husband lived in a 60 unit apartment 
complex where Wife did cleaning after she came home from work at the foot clinic. 
(T86) 
6. Shirley Woodward, office manager of the Berkeley Foot Clinic testified that 
Wife was hired at the foot clinic because Wife and Husband's goals fit the clinic's 
desire for an assistant who was interested in learning to manage her husband's 
podiatry practice, both "front office" (administrative-office manager) and "back 
office" (minor procedures and assisting with surgeries-podiatric assistant). (T 25-29, 
37-40) Wife's application letter stated, "[M]y goal is to manage my husband's 
podiatric practice." (PI Exhibit 2) Woodward testified of Wife's enthusiasm to learn 
to manage Husband's practice and that Wife had discussed that she was forsaking her 
teaching goals to become a team with her Husband. (T 31, 40) She testified that Wife 
attended work in tattered clothing while putting Husband through podiatric college. (T 
32) She observed Wife do research for Husband's school reports using clinic 
journals. (T 33-34) She observed Wife at work fatigued and suffering from headaches 
following her automobile accident. (T 33) She observed Wife and Husband jointly 
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working on an article they were authoring together and she remembered Wife being 
excited when Husband's first article, co-authored with Wife's employer, Dr. Wolpa, 
was published. (T 34) Kay Maxwell testified that she observed Wife typing 
Husband's research paper. (T 46) 
Scholarly Articles and Automobile Accident 
7. As a result of Wife's employment with Dr. Wolpa, Husband authored his 
first two articles for scholarly publications. The first was co-authored with Dr. 
Wolpa, Wife's employer. The second article, Improving Relationships: Listening 
Skills for the Successful Podiatry Office, was co-authored by Wife and based upon her 
experience in Dr. Wolpa's office. Both of these articles were prominently featured on 
Husband's resume. (T 85, 87-88, 268-69, 398-399; PI Exhibit 5 p. 5) Husband's 
resume was used to obtain his surgical residency. (T 398) Wife used her English 
skills, research skills and typing skills to edit and type every article Husband 
published. (T 85, 88-89) Wife also assisted Husband with his presentations. (T 90-
91) Husband credited Wife for assisting him, but testified that Wife's involvement 
was lesser in later articles he published. (T 318-319; PI Exhibit 5 p. 3-5) 
8. In 1988 Wife was in an automobile accident which resulted in months of 
continual painful headaches, muscle spasms and pain. Although Wife was pregnant 
with the parties' first child at the time of the accident, Wife continued to work full 
time until the day Heather was born on November 2, 1988, when she took eight 
weeks maternity leave before returning to work full time. (T 32-33, 101-102) 
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Husband's Residency and VA Fellowship 
9. Husband completed podiatry school in May, 1991, receiving both a Doctor 
of Podiatric Medicine and a masters degree in podiatric medical education. (T 91, 
269; PI Exhibit 5) Wife quit her job with the Berkeley Foot Center when the parties 
then moved to Southern California for Husband to serve a two-year surgical residency 
program. (T 91) Husband received a stipend of $1,000 per month. (PI Exhibit 17 p.6) 
Otherwise, earned income was limited to some in-home day care provided by Wife 
who stayed home with the new child and became pregnant with the parties' second 
child. (T 101, 104-105; PI Exhibit 10) The parties survived on Wife's accrued 
retirement from the Berkeley Health Clinic of $1,766 (T 99; PI Exhibit 10) and on 
Wife's $13,800 net personal injury settlement from her automobile accident which 
went to pay living expenses, pay credit cards, buy a freezer and put money down on a 
car for the family. (T 102-103, 337-338) The parties lived in a home which belonged 
to the estate of Wife's mother and Wife gave birth to their second child on April 29, 
1992. The parties' combined earnings were $15,234 for 1991 with $9,353 earned by 
Wife before she left the Berkeley Foot Clinic. (PI Exhibit 10) Earned income in 1992 
was only $8,913. Wife did not work out of the home in deference to Husband's 
wishes that she stay home with the child. (T 120-123) Wife did some occasional in-
home day care. (T 216) Husband testified that he never asked Wife to work during 
this time and that there had been a problem with an "accusation" relating to a 
"babysitting problem" while Husband was in college, but denied that he had ever 
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advised Wife not to work. (T 324, 393) 
10. In mid-1993 the parties moved to Salt Lake City where Husband accepted 
a fellowship with the Veterans Administration which provided an annual stipend of 
$7,600. The parties' adjusted gross income in 1993 was $10,009. (T 106, 110; PI 
Exhibit 11) At this time the parties rented a home in Woods Cross, Utah. Wife did 
not work except to occasionally tend children in the home. (T 107) 
Podiatry Practice 
11. In April, 1994 Husband began his Podiatry practice while still associated 
with the Veterans Administration. (T 109) Wife arranged patient visits, scheduled 
surgeries and performed Husband's billings, including setting up the electronic billing 
system with Medicare. (T 109-110) Reported business income was $22,013 for 1994, 
with $7,200 from the VA bringing total income to about $30,000. (T 107, 110: PI 
Exhibit 12) This was the final tax return which would be signed by both parties. 
12. Husband's practice consisted chiefly as a mobile home health practice 
conducted from the parties' Lay ton home. (T 109) Such arrangement avoided the 
expense of setting up and staffing an office. (T 109) Most of Husband's income came 
through house calls and nursing home visits. (T 356-7) Husband also worked part 
time through the Diabetes Health Center and did surgeries at hospitals. (T 357, 361) 
Husband also acted as the medical director of two rehabilitation/rest home facilities, 
earning $500 per month for such services. (T 124; PI Exhibit 19) Husband had 
minimal overhead requirements, and testified that the trunk of his car was his office. 
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(T 359-360) 
$20,000 per Month Revenues 
13. Wife conducted billings and maintained Husband's business records for 
1994 through the first months of 1995. In early 1995 Husband recommended to 
Wife, who was about to give birth to the parties' third daughter, that she should cease 
managing his billings and turn the billings over to Frank Jensen of Medi-Serve, a 
professional billing service which provided services to the Diabetes Health Center. (T 
109, 130, 331-332) 
14. Husband and Wife met Frank Jensen at a restaurant in North Salt Lake. 
The parties discussed how billings had previously been handled. Frank Jensen was 
concerned that there would be sufficient billing volume to justify his taking the 
accounts for a 7 percent commission. In response Husband advised Mr. Jensen that 
Husband's revenues were $20,000 per month. (T 50-51, 56-7) Medi-Serve accepted 
the account and commenced its services in about March, 1995. (T 52, 66) 
15. Medi-Serve performed Husband's billings only for a short time before 
Husband determined to move collections to Laura Rogers (a/k/a Laura Warberg), a 
patient with whom he was developing a personal relationship. (T 57-8 114-115, 288-
289) (See Note 4, infra.) Between the months of March and August 1995 monthly 
Medi-Serve billings ranged from $25,284 (March) to $16,606 (August). (PI Exhibit 
29) For the months of April 1995 to August 1995, monthly revenues collected 
averaged $16,336 or an annual rate of $196,032. (PI Exhibit 29) However, by June 
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1995 Husband was already shifting billings to Laura Rogers (T 55-56, 288-289) and 
Husband arranged for payments to come directly to Husband instead of Jensen or 
Rogers. (T 312) Accordingly, Medi-Serve's billings and collections were not 
maximized. (T 55-58) Mr. Jensen testified that the standard write-off from billings to 
that actually collected was ten to fifteen percent. (T 58) Jensen testified he saw no 
reason for Husband's business volume to decrease.2 (T 56) 
16. On October 2, 1995 Husband listed his monthly income as $20,000 in two 
places on his application to lease a Ford Explorer. (T 379-380; PI Exhibit 30) 
17. Husband's daily handwritten records in his purple notebook between 
October 2, 1995 and March 30, 1996 confirmed that his practice was generating about 
$20,000 per month.3 (PI Exhibit 22, 24) The purple notebook's entries averaged 
$18,797 per month in home health services or an annual billing rate of $225,574 for 
home health income.4 Although these billing volumes corresponded to billings done 
2Husband testified that his income was down in late 1995 and thereafter, and that he 
suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, bi-polar condition and other maladies. (T 353, 
358-359, 377-378) However, it was during the very October 1995 time period labeled 
by Husband as his Chronic Fatigue episode that Husband sauntered into the car 
dealership, represented his income as $20,000 per month and leased a Ford Explorer. (T 
392) Husband's fatigue corresponded to the intensifying of his relationship with Laura 
Rogers. (See Note 4, infra.) Wife was unaware of this affliction. (T 205) 
3Entries months totaled as follows: October 1995: $18,979; November 1995: 
$17,909; December 1995: $19,128; January 1996: $14,460; February 1996: $18,836; 
March 1996: $23,475. (PI Exhibit 22, 24) The average for these months was $18,797. 
Husband claims he was ill from late 1995 and January and February are slow months 
each year while Medicare deductibles are met. (T 353) 
4The period of summer 1995 through summer 1996 coincided with the intensifying 
of Husband's personal relationship with his patient/bookkeeper, Laura Rogers and 
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by Frank Jensen, Husband claimed that his handwritten notes were not accurate. (T 
380) Wife testified that Husband had earned $4,000 in one day. (T 418-419) 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 71 reflected a $2,340 billing day. 
18. Other records verified the level of Husband's income. The $12,246 listed 
as commission expenses on line 11 of Schedule C to Husband's 1996 tax return equates 
to gross receipts of $188,400 for the year, based upon the 6.5% commission then 
being paid to Laura Rogers for collections made.5 ($12,246/.065 = $188,400) (T 274, 
301; PI Exhibit 16, 67, 69) Commissions reflected only income collected through 
Rogers efforts, and did not account for additional income directly collected by 
Husband's motivation to manipulate his income. 
On July 5, 1996, Wife confronted Husband about his relationship with Laura 
Rogers. Husband told Wife that he and Rogers "could not live without each other any 
more." (T 115) Husband denied the conversation. (T 309) In August, 1996 Husband 
took a trip to California to see his sister. On the way back Laura Rogers flew to Las 
Vegas where she met Husband. The two drove back to Salt Lake City together. (T 116, 
309-310) Husband hospitalized himself for alleged emotional problems in September, 
1996. (T 116-117, 353-354) These distractions plus Husband's deliberate hiding of 
income resulted in a subsequent reduction of documented income. Husband did not deny 
an argument with Laura Rogers in June 1997 wherein Rogers complained that Husband 
was not working enough. (T 291-292) 
During his deposition Husband invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned 
about the nature of his relationship with Laura Rogers, although at trial he denied the 
relationship was sexual. (T 289-290) Rogers took other trips with Husband, including 
one to Chicago in June, 1997. (T 286-287) Husband gave gifts to Rogers and her 
children. (T 300) 
5
"Revenues" and "collections" are income actually received, as opposed to "billings." 
Collections of $188,400 correlate to billings of $221,647, at a 15 % write-off rate. Laura 
Rogers' commission rate was 6% until February, 1996 when it increased to 6.5%. 
(T 274; PI Exhibit 67) Husband testified only that his tax preparer had checks and 
ledgers and he did not understand his return. (T 296) Thus, not all commissions may 
have been listed on the return where Husband did not want to tip off the IRS to his higher 
income. 
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Husband. 
19. Also, paragraph 2.a. of Husband's affidavit provided at a hearing in this 
action in January, 1997, conservatively listed monthly billing service expense of about 
$1,000. (PI Exhibit 34) At 6.5 percent this correlates to collections of $15,385 per 
month or $184,615 per year, again without considering direct collections by Husband. 
((1,000/.065)*12 = 184,615) 
Practice Potential 
20. Husband testified that it usually takes five to seven years for a podiatrist 
practice to maximize. (T 305) Husband's practice had only been operating about 2lh 
years when the parties separated in October, 1996. (T 115) Husband was not fully 
devoting himself to his practice as he turned his interests to Laura Rogers and 
resulting complications. (See Note 4 supra.) Husband is able to defer submitting 
Medicaid accounts for up to a year, thereby artificially reducing his income. (T 255) 
21. Wife testified that Husband received cash and kept sums of up to $2,000 
hidden in the home. (T 143-145, 354-355) Husband's bank deposits were often net of 
cash back at time of deposit. (T 137, 311; PI Exhibit 27) 
Laura Rogers Disappears 
22. Husband testified that knowledge of his receivables and collections was 
"Laura Roger's business. Not mine." (T 305) However, Laura Rogers could not be 
found by constables attempting to subpoena her to trial. (T 8-12) Husband testified 
during trial on February 6, 1998, that Rogers' had been given notice with her services 
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to end effective February 9, 1998. (T 287) Husband had last provided billing 
information to Rogers a week prior to trial. (T 288) 
Credit Union and Bank Accounts 
23. Husband had acknowledged accounts at Veterans Administration Credit 
Union and Zions Bank. (PI Exhibits 19, 25, 26) Asked about having other accounts, 
Husband testified, "Maybe I have forgotten something but I'm not aware of 
anything." (T 397) Deposit records to Husband's checking and savings accounts in 
1995 totaled $149,124.18. Including Zions Bank as well as VA Credit Union 
deposits, acknowledged deposits for 1996 totaled $230,561, $89,000 of which was 
from inheritances received by Husband ($10,000 deposited on January 29, 1996 and 
$79,000 deposited on August 26, 1996). (PI Exhibits 25, 26, 34 % 5) Husband's 
deposits for 1997 came to $105,314 according to Husband's testimony. (T 329) The 
trial court recognized $143,124 of deposits to the VAMCU accounts only for 1995, 
ignoring $6,000 in deposits to the Zions account of Husband's monthly $500 receipts 
from his duties as medical director of the two nursing homes. (Finding of Fact 9; R 
369, 477; PI Exhibits 19, 25, 26) The trial court recognized $137,607 of deposits to 
the VAMCU accounts in 1996 after deducting the $89,000 inheritance and ignoring 
$4,500 earned from the nursing home directorships. The trial court accepted 
Husband's statement of 1997 deposits of $105,314 despite being unsupported by any 
bank statements (Def Exhibit 3), despite Husband's testimony that he didn't know the 
exact amount of his 1997 earnings (T 329) and despite expressly finding that Husband 
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had been dishonest in his representations of his income. (R 369, 477) The court then 
averaged the three years to arrive at an average annual gross income of $128,681. 
This figure was about one-half of the $240,000 per year Husband listed on his 
October 2, 1995, financial statement and half of the $240,000 per year revenues 
Husband represented to Frank Jensen in early 1995. Wife accordingly appeals this 
finding. 
Husband's Business Expenses 
24. The trial court found that Husband's reasonable business expenses were 
$40,000 per year leaving income after business expenses of $88,681. The trial court 
then used this figure to calculate alimony and child support. (R 369, 371, 477-479) 
25. After the parties' separation, Husband presented tax returns for 1995 and 
1996 which Wife declined to sign as patently inaccurate. (T 117-119; PI Exhibits 15, 
16) Wife filed her own returns for 1995 and 1996. (PI Exhibits 13, 14) Husband 
filed the 1995 joint return without Wife's signature or permission. (T 197; PI Exhibit 
15) 
26. The trial court found that the 1995 and 1996 tax returns and other 
information provided by Husband did not accurately reflect Husband's income, stating 
"The Court finds that Respondent is not being forthright and honest in his 
representation of what his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997." 
(Finding of Fact 11; R 369, 477) 
27. The Court's finding that Husband's business expenses were $40,000 per 
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year ($3,333/month) was liberal to Husband, particularly in light of the Court's 
crediting Husband with only half of his earned income. Husband's Schedule C to the 
parties' 1994 tax return listed business expenses of $24,474 which included $5,100 
paid by Husband to Wife and declared by Wife on her own Schedule C-EZ. (PL 
Exhibit 12) Husband's Schedule C for 1995 showed business expenses of $33,192 
including $1,767 depreciation and an erroneous $10,199 "other" rent expense which 
related to deductions for Husband's mother's house rather than to Husband's practice. 
(T 296-297, 326; PL Exhibit 15) Omitting the depreciation and "other" rent, 
Husband's 1995 business expenses were $21,226. Husband's 1996 Schedule C 
showed expenses of $46,496 after excluding the $14,889 Medicare payback discussed 
infra at 1f 39 which should have appeared at returns and allowances, line 2. This 
return also had $8,547 of "other" business rental which could not be explained and 
$8,324 of vehicle lease expenses.6 Like the 1995 return, this return grossly 
understated Husband's income. (T 326-329; PI Exhibit 16) Considering the $24,474 
expenses for 1994, $21,226 expenses for 1995 and the expenses for 1996, the trial 
court was overly generous in finding Husband's reasonable business expenses to be 
$40,000. 
28. Husband's affidavit filed with the Court in 1997 was clearly inflated as it 
claimed as necessary business expenses the sports car at $770 per month and the 
6Husband's home health practice produced little overhead as Husband did not 
maintain a clinic or pay any staff. (T 109, 356-60) 
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Explorer at $450 per month. It also claimed the Medicare repayment which had 
already been fully paid back. (T 230-231; PI Exhibit 34) Husband's list of business 
expenses submitted to the court at trial was not substantiated by any receipts or 
primary documentation. (Def Exhibit 6) This list totaled $7,440 per month of 
expenses and included items such as $860 per month for automobile payments for two 
vehicles, $300 per month for maintenance and gasoline, and office supplies of $250 
per month when Husband testified that the trunk of his car served as his office and his 
check register showed that medical supplies were only $72 per month. (T 189, 360) It 
also included as business expenses student loans of $1,700 per month and a storage 
shed ($40) which were personal expenses. Husband's business expenses and personal 
expenses totaled to $9,865 compared to claimed monthly income of $9,000. (Def 
Exhibit 4) Husband's personal expenses included $450 per month for groceries for 
one person, automobile insurance of $140 (although $1,160 auto expense had already 
been claimed as business expense) and medical insurance premiums of $650 compared 
to $330 for Husband, Wife and children on Husband's January 2, 1997 affidavit. (PI 
Exhibit 34) 
29. Either the $12,246 commissions claimed on line 11 of 1996 Schedule C 
are correct and Laura Rogers collected $188,400 of revenues during 1996 
($12.246/.065 = $188,400) or commissions was highly inflated ($97,549 [gross 
receipts on line 1 of Schedule C] * .065 = $6,341 [assuming every dollar collected by 
Laura Rogers]). (PI Exhibits 67, 69) This analysis of income again excludes 
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additional income received by Husband which was not collected through Laura 
Rogers. 
Wife's Income 
30. The parties' total incomes and respective contributions thereto to 1994, the 
first year of Husband's practice, are summarized as follows: (Exhibit 78 reproduce) 
(PI Exhibit 78) Whereas Wife had provided over 90 percent of the parties' income 
while Husband was in college, Wife's earnings were $134 for 1995 and $376 for 
1996. (PI Exhibit 13, 14) To 1993, Wife had never enjoyed a combined income of 
over $24,000 and had subsisted on much less for most years. In 1994 Husband's 
income reached $29,000, including $5,000 paid to Wife, as he commenced his 
practice. In 1995 Husband's income increased to $20,000 per month with Wife seeing 
very little of it. 
31. At the time of the breakup of the marriage Wife had become the full time 
mother of three children. Wife had put aside her teaching career in 1987 while 
Husband earned his degrees and started his practice. Wife's Utah teaching certificate 
expired while she was in California. (T 151) The parties' plans for Wife to manage 
Husband's podiatry practice also had come to an end, with Wife caring for three small 
children. After the parties separated, Wife attempted to perform medical transcription 
at home for two months in 1997 but her computer did not match the clinic's computer. 
Doctor's office positions would have required her to work until 7:00 p.m. and thus 
were rejected due to the children's needs. (T 146-148) Wife also worked as a 
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substitute teacher for $50.00 per day when such work was available. (T 231-232) At 
time of trial Wife had been working towards re-certifying as an English teacher, but 
lacking such certification, had not been able to take a teaching position. (T 150-152, 
234-235; PI Exhibit 39) Further, there was a glut of English teachers in the Davis 
School District leaving her unlikely to secure a position. (T 153-154, 235-237) Wife 
learned that there were openings to teach business, science and math, but such would 
require that she attend college for two years to quality to teach. Accordingly, Wife 
was considering obtaining a master's degree, since such would similarly take the two-
year time investment. {Id.) The trial court imputed income to Wife of $1,000.00 per 
month. (R 370, 478) 
32. Connie Romboy, a vocational counseler, testified that she met with Wife 
and found her to be centered and desirous of working, but faced with a dilemma since 
there were not sufficient vocational opportunities in English teaching. Romboy 
recommended that, as opposed to two years college to re-certify to teach in another 
area, Wife should, in the same amount of time, obtain a masters degree in social work 
or educational counseling which would allow her to start her career at a higher pay 
scale than starting as a teacher. (T 401-405) She testified education would cost about 
$3,000 per year for tuition and books. (T 405) Romboy testified that if Wife had 
begun teaching in 1987 she would have contributed $18,180 to retirement by 1997 and 
that she would have progressed up the pay scale for ten years rather than starting at 
the bottom. (T 408-410) 
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Home 
33. Though married in 1987, Wife and Husband never owned a home of their 
own until summer 1994. At this time the parties purchased a modest, three bedroom 
home in Layton, Utah for $95,000, putting $6,000 down from money provided by 
Husband's grandfather. (T 70, 92, 254, 374; PI Exhibit 73) The home appraised at 
$118,000 at time of trial in an "as is" condition. (T 15, 19; PI Exhibit 73) At the 
time of trial the home had unrepaired fire damage in the kitchen. (T 15-16) To put 
the home in average marketing condition numerous items needed to be addressed: 
these included replacing particle board under the kitchen floor and vinyl floor 
coverings, dishwasher and microwave oven purchased and installed. The carpet in the 
living room, stairwell and hallway was old and needed to be replaced. Baby rooms 
and master bedroom needed work with the master bedroom having "some type of a 
plaster or stucco texture all over the dry wall" but not finished and with a strange 
coloring underneath. (T 17 245; See pictures in PI Exhibit 73) These improvements 
would cost about $7,500 and would need to be done before average condition for the 
home could be reached. (T 18) Wife, destitute from Husband's failure to pay support, 
had not been able to pay for such repairs at time of trial. Accordingly, the home was 
worth no more that $118,000 at time of trial. The mortgage balance was $91,258. (T 
160; PI Exhibit 80) Wife requested that she be awarded the home. (T 242) 
34. Although Husband's income took off in 1995, Wife saw little of it. 
Husband did, before the parties' separation purchase fine cars, including a turbo 
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charged Volvo sports car ($770 per month), 1991 Ford Explorer ($450 per month) 
and a 1995 Volvo station wagon ($570 per month) with monthly payments totaling 
$1,790. (T 139 -141; PI Exhibit 34) Husband drove the Volvo sports car and 
Explorer. (T 140) Wife drove the station wagon. (T 141) By time of trial Wife had 
traded in the Volvo Wagon with the $570 payment for a mini-van with a $248 
payment. (T 141) After separation, in May 1997, Husband traded in the 1991 
Explorer for a 1996 Jeep. (T 140) Husband testified that he required two vehicles for 
his business; one as a spare car. (T 390) Wife questioned Husband's need for a spare 
car when he was not paying support as ordered. (T 390) 
35. Wife had not had funds to take any vacations with the children although 
Husband had taken the children on trips and had also taken Laura Rogers on trips. (T 
161, 285-287) 
Church Assistance 
36. Much of the parties' furniture had been inherited from Husband's 
grandmother and was taken by Husband when he left the home. (T 175-178; PI 
Exhibits 49, 50, 51) Wife had no funds to purchase new items. Friends and family 
gave Wife table and chairs. (T 177) Wife and children received assistance from the 
LDS Church to meet living expenses due to Husband's refusal to pay support as 
ordered. (T 182-183) Wife borrowed $13,100 from her mother to pay for part of her 
attorney's fees and $575 for other needs.7 (T 190, 260; PI Exhibit 75) 
7$ 10,600 had been loaned to Wife by her mother for fees by November 17,1997, as 
reflected by the first page of Exhibit 75 ($10,000 by checks to attorneys and $600 cash). 
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Daycare Private School 
37. Wife placed the children in a day care setting which also provided private 
school to the daughters old enough to attend school because the cost was comparable 
to combining public school and day care costs. Wife also did this because she had 
anticipated getting a teaching job with a traditional school schedule and desired that 
the children have the same schedule, whereas the local public schools used the track 
system. (T 162-167, 236) She found that the parties' 9 year old daughter thrived at 
the school and her grades improved. (T 165-166; PI Exhibit 60) She desired this 
arrangement continue. The trial court ruled that private school could be provided only 
if Wife paid for it. (Finding of Fact 6; R 367-368, 476, 489) 
Wife's Expenses 
38. Wife provided the trial court with two sets of her monthly expenses: One 
based upon her current monthly expenses of $4,504.50 (T 160; PI Exhibit 41) The 
second set proposed how she would utilize an adequate award of reimbursement 
alimony and child support based upon the level of Husband's income she had not been 
able to enjoy but which had accrued to Husband through her efforts and sacrifices. 
Expenses under the second set came to $9,275.09 and included private school for the 
children, additional clothing for Wife and children, education expenses for Wife to 
attend college, residence maintenance, travel, additional alimony-related income tax 
The additional $2,500 was loaned by Wife's mother by paying Wife's attorneys $2,000 
on December 8, 1997, and $500 on February 2, 1998. {See last two pages of Exhibit 75) 
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expense and other items. (T 160-161, 167-168, 238-239; PI Exhibit 42) The trial 
court, imputed Husband's annual gross income at only $128,681 instead of the 
$240,000 evidenced by Husband's business records, car application and statement to 
Frank Jensen. Ignoring these additional earnings available for equalizing, and Wife's 
unrecompensed sacrifices, the trial court based Wife's reasonable expenses at only 
$4,000 per month. (Findings of Fact 10, 11; R 370, 478, 490) The trial court also 
imputed income to Wife of $1,000 leaving a deficit of $3,000 which was covered by 
an award of child support of $1,482 per month and alimony of $1,518. {Id.) 
Re-billed Medicare Re-payment 
39. A side issue concerned about $14,889 in Medicare payments received by 
Husband in 1995 which had to be repaid to Medicare during 1996.8 Husband asserted 
that repayment resulted from fraudulent billing practices by Wife and Frank Jensen of 
Medi-Serve. (T 301-303, 327, 32-333, 378-380; Def Exhibit 12) Wife and Jensen 
both testified that they simply billed as told by Husband and that it was Husband's 
failure to document procedures which resulted in re-payment when a Medicare audit 
noted lack of charting. (T 59-60, 142-143) If Husband had properly documented his 
services no re-payment would have been required and Husband's 1996 income would 
not have been lowered by the re-payment. (T 54-55) Jensen, in response to 
Husband's accusation of billing fraud, testified that Medi-Serve, for ten years, had 
8Husband's 1996 tax return listed the payback amount at $14,889 on line 27 of 
Schedule C. (PI Exhibit 16) This should have been listed under returns and allowances, 
line 2 instead of appearing as a business expense. 
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been on Medicare's "blue ribbon" list of approved medical billing companies and was 
on "good terms with Medicare." (T. 60) Husband testified at trial that he and Laura 
Rogers had since documented his procedures and re-billed for these services. (T 396) 
Husband could not say whether re-payment of the re-billed re-payment had occurred 
as Laura Rogers had such information and was not available to testify. {Id.) 
Wife's Ring and Credit 
40. After separation Husband had billed items to Wife's credit card including a 
new diamond for Wife's wedding ring which Husband gave to Wife in hopes of 
reconciliation while not telling Wife of the source of credit for the ring. These acts 
plus Husband's refusal to pay support and bills, resulted in Wife's credit being 
seriously damaged. The trial court enjoined the parties from harming each other's 
credit in the future. (T 168-171, 235, 242, 281; PI Exhibit 43, 46, Finding of Fact 16; 
R 372, 480, 492, 579 p. 19-20, 23-34) 
Husband's Contempt 
41. Husband was found in contempt of court for failing to pay $13,350 of 
temporary support during the pendency of the action, which amount corresponded to 
the alimony portion of the temporary support order. (T 180-181; Finding of Fact 18; 
R 372-373, 381, 492; PI Exhibit 53) This finding followed the filing of an affidavit 
by Wife alleging such contempt on the part of Husband and after the matter had been 
certified for trial at the pre-trial. While not receiving her support Wife received the 
final $3,500 of her personal injury settlement, which she spent on necessities. (T 158-
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159) Wife's request that Husband be ordered to provide security for payment of his 
support obligations was denied. (T 194-195; R 301-302, 378, 579 p. 20-21) 
Wife's "Contempt" 
42. Although no affidavit had ever been filed by Husband and no claim was 
ever made that Wife was in contempt, Wife was held in contempt by the Court for 
failing to allow Husband visitation. Wife appeals this ruling as violating her rights of 
due process and as being wholly unsupported by evidence. (T. 351) (Finding of Fact 
19; R 373, 481, 493, 579 p. 21-22) 
Attorney's Fees 
43. Wife's attorney's fees came to $33,998.90 as a result of Husband's 
continuing refusal to follow court orders, provide true evidence of his earnings and 
Wife's need to prove the earnings. Wife used $5,000 paid from Husband's VA credit 
union account at the time of separation to pay attorney's fees, but had otherwise paid 
fees with funds borrowed from her mother or had not paid her fees. The trial court 
found that Wife had no ability to pay her fees and that Husband did have the ability. 
However, the Court ordered Husband to pay only $20,000 of Wife's fees, rather than 
the total amount of $28,998.90 after crediting Husband for the $5,000 paid to Wife at 
the beginning of the action. (Findings of Fact 18, 20; T 184-5, 198, 221-222, 256-
261; R 319-355,373, 481-482, 493; PI Exhibit 75) Wife appeals the trial court's 
failure to award her all of her attorney's fees. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Wife sacrificed over thirteen years and the marriage ended on the verge of 
Husband's financial success as a podiatrist. The trial court did not err in setting child 
support and alimony too high and in awarding Wife all equity in the marital home 
(Points I, III, IV). On the other hand, the trial court erred in ignoring overwhelming 
evidence that Husband's adjusted gross income was over $200,000 per year, in setting 
child support, alimony too low and in not ordering Husband to pay for private 
schooling for the children (Points X, XI). The trial court did not err in ordering non-
terminable alimony (Point II), but did err in failing to make such alimony non-
terminable for thirteen years rather than five years (Points II, XI). The trial court's 
allocation of assets and debt was appropriate (Points III, VI). Where Husband refused 
to pay support as ordered, the trial court appropriately declined to grant Husband the 
tax exemptions (Point V). Given the disparities in incomes it was within the court's 
discretion to order Husband to pay all insurance expenses for the children (Point VII). 
The trial court appropriately awarded Wife attorney's fees (Point VIII), but the 
court erred in not awarding Wife all of her fees (Point XIII). The trial court abused 
its discretion in not ordering Husband to provide security to assure payment of support 
(Point XII). Wife must be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. (Point XIV) 
ARGUMENT 
OBJECTION - FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
Throughout his arguments Husband fails to marshal the evidence and to provide 
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this Court with all of the evidence available to the trial court. In Utah Medical 
Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998) the Supreme Court stated: 
This court has clearly stated the burden of one who challenges a trial 
court's findings of fact as follows: 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
"[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.' " 
... After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, 
an appellant must demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial 
court, the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. ... We apply this 
deferential standard to trial courts because of their advantaged position to 
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts. ... If the challenger fails to meet 
this burden, its claim must fail. ... (citations omitted.) 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Insofar as Its Rulings Set a 
Minimum Income Level of Support to Be Paid by Husband.9 
A. Mrs. Johnson's Lack of Income 
Wife and Connie Romboy both testified that due to a glut of certified English 
teachers there had been, and likely would be, no job openings for English teachers in 
the Davis School District. Therefore, it was anticipated that Wife would need to 
return to school for two years to either certify in another area of teaching or to obtain 
a masters degree. (Facts f 31, 32) Husband's failure to advise the Court of these 
facts fails to provide the basis for the trial court's decision to impute income to Wife 
9Wife's cross-appeal at Points X and XI, infra, challenges the trial court's failure to 
recognize Husband's full income and its imputation of income to Wife. 
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at only $1,000 per month. 
A teacher could earn the amounts testified to by Ms. Romboy only if she were 
certified in a subject where she could find employment. Absent such nexus there was 
no basis for the trial court to impute income higher than minimum wage to Wife. 
Wife's certificate to teach English lapsed while she put Husband through podiatry 
college with the mutual goal that she would manage his practice. (Facts ff 1-9, 31) 
At Husband's urging Wife eventually gave up the goal of managing Husband's 
practice to raise the parties' children. (Facts f 13) There was no evidence offered to 
show that Wife could find a position in a podiatrist office in Utah with pay 
comparable to that in the San Francisco Bay area. At the time of trial, it had been 
nearly seven years since Wife worked in the podiatry office in California. Rather than 
showing that Wife was employable as a teacher, Ms. Romboy's testimony showed the 
opportunity cost of Wife's decision to forego her teaching career to put Husband 
through college and raise the parties' children. (Facts f 32) 
B. Dr. Johnson's Income 
Husband omits to advise the Court that the trial court did deduct Husband's 
$89,000 inheritances from deposits to Husband's credit union accounts for 1996 to 
arrive at the net amount of $137,697.10 The court's ruling expressly so stated. (R 
368-369, 477) 
Husband omits to advise the Court that the approximate $14,889 Medicare re-
10The trial court ignored the additional $4,500 deposited to the Zions account in 1996 
as well as the $6,000 deposited to the Zions account in 1995. (PI Exhibits 25, 26) 
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payment was shown to be the result of Husband's failure to document procedures, not 
that these payments were not earned. (Facts ^ 39) Indeed Husband testified that his 
office had since documented and re-billed these items. (Id.) Therefore, the trial court 
was within its discretion to ignore this re-billed re-payment. 
The trial court erred in Husband's favor in using the average of 1995, 1996 and 
1997 deposits where Husband clearly was hiding income and his 1997 deposits were 
not supported by bank documents, but only Husband's word, which the court found 
unbelievable. (Facts f 26) The trial court had overwhelming reason to disbelieve 
Husband's tax returns and other documentation submitted. 
Husband's reasonable expenses were liberally set at $3,333 per month by the 
court where Husband provided little documentation to support his claimed expenses 
and where Husband's Schedule C's to the 1994 and 1995 tax returns included 
appropriate business deductions of less than $2,000 per month. (Facts f 27) A 
complete discussion of Husband's expenses are set forth at Facts f f 24-29. Husband's 
student loans are a personal expense. They were incurred three to six years before 
Husband commenced his podiatry practice. The student loans were not in jeopardy. 
(T 395) 
C. Combined Income 
The court's combined income actually failed to recognize all of Husband's 
income and imputed income to Wife in excess of minimum wage. Husband's support 
obligation was set far to low as shown by Wife's cross-appeal at Points X and XI. 
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II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Award of Non-Terminable 
Alimony to Wife 
Wife again objects to Husband's failure to marshal the evidence. Wife's 
entitlement to alimony was not limited to her expenditures during over 13 years of 
sacrifices which ended on the verge of Husband's success and such entitlement should 
not terminate before Wife has been reimbursed for her sacrifices. 
Wife sacrificed her desire to become an English teacher in order to provide 
support to her Husband and family with a view of jointly operating a successful 
podiatry practice. Wife was left with neither a teaching career nor podiatry practice. 
Her sacrifice enveloped over thirteen years of living in near-poverty conditions. At 
time of trial she was 35 years old with full responsibility for three children ages 9, 5 
and 2-1/2. 
The evidence showed that Wife supported Husband through school and lived 
with little until Husband started his practice in 1994. (Facts f f 4-12) The evidence 
further shows that Wife received little of the benefit of Husband greatly increasing 
incomes in 1995 and 1996 because of Husband's control of funds and Husband's 
diversions with his patient/bookkeeper Laura Rogers. (Facts f f 33-36) From late 
1996 when this action was filed to early 1998 when trial was held, Husband refused to 
pay the alimony portion of support resulting in a judgment against Husband of 
$13,350 and a finding that Husband was in contempt of court. (Facts f f 36, 41) 
Wife lived over 13 years of spartan existence until her divorce. During the 
years 1984 to 1991 which included Husband's college, the parties' combined annual 
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earnings ranged from $3,048 to $24,867, the greater majority of which was earned by 
Wife. During Husband's residency the parties lived on Husband's $1,000 per month 
stipend and Wife's personal injury settlement and retirement. When they returned to 
Utah in 1993, Husband's income was only $10,009. (Facts %% 3, 5, 9, 10, 30) 
After the parties moved to Utah, they rented a home in Woods Cross, Utah. 
(Facts if 10) Their first and only purchased home, in which Wife and the children 
now live, is extremely modest, dilapidated and has only three bedrooms for Wife and 
three children. (Facts 1f 33) Only for a few months before the break-up of the 
marriage did Wife ever enjoy any hint of a "high life" and that was limited to driving 
a Volvo wagon which she has since had to replace with a Nissan mini-van in order to 
cut costs. (Facts f34) 
Although Wife did never enjoyed a lifestyle comparable to that expected from 
an annual income exceeding $200,000 after business expenses,11 it is equally true that 
Wife sacrificed and supported Husband, his home and the children through many lean 
years in anticipation that she and the children would benefit from the sacrifice. 
The Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have recognized that 
alimony should be adjusted to compensate the sacrificing party when the marriage 
ends on the brink of financial success. In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1987) the Court recognized the difference between 1) the traditional case where 
the marriage holds together long enough for the sacrificing party to benefit from an 
11
 See Points X and XI, infra. 
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elevated standard of living and an increase in marital property as a result of the 
medical degree; and 2) the case where divorce occurs shortly after the degree is 
finally received but before the sacrificing spouse can enjoy any benefit through an 
enhanced standard of living or an acquisition of substantial marital property based 
thereon. In note 4, at page 242, the Court stated that while traditional alimony 
analysis may be applied in the former case, a more creative approach must be used in 
the latter: 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by Graham, where 
divorce occurs shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional alimony 
analysis would often work hardship because, while both spouses have 
modest incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the threshold of a 
significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so 
the other could attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the anticipated 
dividends the degree will ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse 
is typically not remote in time from his or her previous education and is 
otherwise better able to adjust and to acquire comparable skills, given the 
opportunity and the funding. In such cases, alimony analysis must 
become more creative to achieve fairness, and an award of 
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not terminable upon 
remarriage, may be appropriate. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 111 
Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 
488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). (Emphasis added.) 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court cited approvingly the increase in alimony ordered by the Court of Appeals 
which considered the doctor husband's income of $100,000.00 per year, even though 
the wife "had not enjoyed a higher standard of living as a result of that increased 
income." The Court noted the trial court's finding that "the parties would have 
enjoyed a higher family income because of Dr. Martinez's increased income, which 
was due to some extent to the efforts of both spouses during the marriage." 
The Utah Court of Appeals in ordering the increase in alimony (and that the 
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award be permanent instead of limited to five years) found that the trial court erred in 
considering only the wife's standard of living during the marriage: 
An application of one of the English standards could justify the 
award made in this case. Wife endured a poor standard of living during 
the marriage. She had little money to spend then so she should have 
little now. That result will preserve "the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage." But such a result is unfair. A divorce court is a 
court of equity. It is not equitable to preserve the status of limited 
income for one party and affluence for the other when the one 
sacrificed to help the other achieve such affluence. When the totality 
of the English standards are applied the award is clearly inadequate. 
Martinez v. Martinez, 745 P.2d 69, 74-75 (Utah App. 1988).12 
(Emphasis added.) 
When it subsequently ruled in Martinez at 818 P.2d 542, the Supreme Court 
directed the use of property division and alimony to reach equitable results. Justice 
Stewart specifically stated: 
"Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in light of the 
standard of living they had during the marriage. (Citations omitted.) In 
some circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to equalize the 
spouse's respective standard of living. (Citations omitted.) When a 
marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated to the efforts put 
forward by the spouses during the marriage, should be given some 
weight in fashioning the support award. (Citation omitted.) Thus, if 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, it may be appropriate 
for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
12
 English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), cited by the Court of 
Appeals in Martinez, states that "the most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge" and the trial court 
should consider "the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to provide 
support." Martinez does away with any basis to read these guidelines too literally at the 
expense of equity. 
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marital property and awarding alimony/' (Emphasis added.) 
Many of the foregoing principals have now been codified. § 30-3-5(7)(e), Utah Code 
Annotated, provides: 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of 
a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 241 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "We acknowledge that there will be situations where an award of non-
terminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony would be appropriate." Such was 
precisely the case here. 
Consistent with the Utah case and statutory law, the trial court herein used 
alimony and property awards to meet the equitable objective of equalizing the parties' 
standards of living and compensating Wife's sacrifices. Considering Wife's over 13 
years sacrifice, the Court's award of 5 years of non-terminable reimbursement 
alimony was minimal. While Wife intended to return to school, earn a masters degree 
and then enter the work force, Wife's future earnings should not be used to offset 
reimbursement alimony, as Wife has earned such alimony through over 13 years of 
prior sacrifice. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993) does not apply to these 
facts. In Johnson, the wife had twenty years of marriage during which she not only 
sacrificed during husband's medical schooling but also, thereafter, benefitted directly 
from Husband's income for sixteen years. The trial court erred in attempting to 
award wife part of husband's "professional status" which was the impermissible 
equivalent of attempting to award a medical degree. Here the court made no such 
ruling and instead based its equitable orders on Wife's failure to ever benefit from her 
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sacrifices as authorized under authorities previously cited.13 Johnson specifically notes 
that non-terminable alimony is permissible in appropriate situations. Id. at 252. 
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Allocation of Marital 
Assets and Debt 
A. Marital Home 
Husband has again failed to marshal the evidence. If one spouse's earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment 
in dividing the marital property. Martinez 818 at 542; § 30-3-5(7)(e), Utah Code 
Annotated, (fl 1-12) 
Wife was awarded a small home (three bedroom for Wife and three daughters) 
which was in poor condition, requiring about $7,500 in repairs and valued at 
$118,300 absent such repairs. The equity in the home without such repairs was only 
about $26,000.14 While Husband mentions that a gift from his grandfather was used 
for the down payment, he fails to cite Wife's sacrifice of her $9,500 inheritance, her 
$1,776 retirement and her $17,300 from personal injury settlements for living 
expenses. (Facts ff 4, 9, 33, 41) The trial court appropriately awarded all equity to 
Wife. 
13Such authorities were cited in Wife's trial memorandum. (R. 294-299) 
14If the home could be sold in its poor condition, after deduction of 10% listing and 
selling expenses ($11,830) only about $14,512 equity would have remained to be split 
between the parties. Husband, thus, argues over $7,256. ($118,300-$11,830-$91,958 
mortgage = $14,512) 
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B. Marital Debt 
Husband has again failed to marshal evidence upon which the trial court relied 
in ordering Husband to pay for the ring. After the parties separated, Husband 
obtained Wife's wedding ring under the ruse of having it cleaned. Instead Husband 
traded in Wife's diamond on a larger stone which cost about $3,500. With some 
further "sleight of hand" Husband charged the new stone and some shoes for Husband 
to Wife's credit card. Husband then presented the ring with new stone to Wife, who 
declined to reconcile. The trial court found that this debt, was incurred after the 
parties had separated and, therefore, should be assessed to Husband as incurred by 
him after separation. (Facts 1f 40) The record fully supports the appropriateness of the 
court's ruling. Husband had "unclean hands" and was in no position to make an 
equitable argument that he should be allowed to return the stone from Wife's ring. 
Such would have left Wife's ring with no stone. 
IV. There Was Substantial Evidence that Wife Required Additional Education. 
Husband wrongly states at page 26 of his brief, "There was no evidence 
presented to indicate that Ms. Johnson will need an additional degree to support 
herself." However, the testimonies of Wife and vocational expert Connie Romboy 
made clear that it was not likely that Wife was going to find an English teaching 
position and that, since Wife would require two years of college to re-certify to 
another teaching area, Wife might just as well obtain a master's degree with two years 
of college. Substitute teaching paid only $50 per day when it was available. The 
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court relied upon this evidence in making a proper decision. (Facts 1f 31-32) 
V. It Was Not in the Best Interests of the Children that Husband Be Awarded 
the Tax Exemptions 
Husband omits to advise the Court of the following facts: At time of trial 
Husband had consistently refused to pay the alimony portion of temporary support 
ordered and judgment was granted against Husband for $13,350. (Facts f 41) Wife 
testified that she should receive the exemptions in light of Husbands' conduct. (T 
197) 
This Court in Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 977-8 (Utah App. 1992), 
discussed the law of awarding tax dependency exemptions: 
To consider whether the court properly awarded the exemption, 
we rely on Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989). ... 
Motes recognizes the presumption created by federal tax law that 
the custodial parent receive the exemption and outlines those 
circumstances where the presumption can be rebutted ... In short, the 
requirements are twofold. First, the noncustodial parent must have a 
higher income and provide the majority of support for the child. 
Second, the trial court must, from its findings, determine that by 
transferring the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent, it is 
not only in the best interest of the parties, but, more importantly, also in 
the best interest of the child, which in all but exceptional circumstances 
would translate into an increased support level for the child. 
Given Husband's refusal to pay support and the court's finding of contempt, it 
is clear that it was not in the best interests of the children that Husband be awarded 
any use of the exemptions. 
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VI. Husband Failed to Meet His Burden to Show That His Inheritance Was 
Used by or for Wife or that Husband's Sacrifice of His Inheritance 
Exceeded Wife's Sacrifice of Her Inheritance, Retirement and Personal 
Injury Settlement 
Husband omits to advise the Court of Wife's sacrifice of her inheritance 
($9,500), retirement ($1,766) and personal injury settlement ($13,800) to the marriage 
during the lean years and Wife's use of $3,500 of additional personal injury settlement 
due to Husband's failure to pay support. (Facts %% 4, 9, 41) Wife had to borrow 
$13,100 from Wife's mother for attorney's fees which were not ordered reimbursed 
by the court. (See Point XIII infra.) 
Husband further omits to advise that the $89,000 of inheritances were deposited 
into Husband's credit union account checking and savings accounts into which a total 
of $226,060.98 was deposited by Husband in 1996. $10,000 of inheritance was 
deposited into Credit Union savings account on January 29, 1996. The deposit of 
Husband's $79,000 inheritance to the credit union checking account occurred on 
August 26, 1996 when the account's balance was $2,928.05. Such deposit included 
an additional $9,625.34 of earnings making the total deposit $88,625.34. Non-
inheritance funds into which inheritance funds were co-mingled were about 
$137,606.98 for 1996. (Facts 1 23) 
Husband cannot, and did not, show that $89,000 of his inheritance was given to 
Wife. Husband used proceeds from such account to pay about $25,000 of credit card 
debt on September 2, 1996, about one month before the parties separated in early 
October, 1996. (T 186; Def Exh 14) By agreement between the parties, $15,000 was 
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placed into three savings accounts of $5,000 for the children on about September 2, 
1996 and Wife, never touching such funds even while Husband refused to pay 
support, did not benefit therefrom. (T 187-188; Def Exhibit 15) 
On October 1, 1992, $5,000 was paid to Wife from the credit union account 
which Wife subsequently used for attorney's fees which Husband would otherwise 
have been ordered to pay herein. (See points VIII and XIII, infra.) However, about 
$10,000 of earned income had been deposited into the VA account between August 
29, 1996, and October 1, 1996, in addition to the $9,625.34 earnings deposited on 
August 26, 1996 and the $2,928.05 already in the account on that date. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that Wife received Husband's inheritance when $22,500 of earned 
funds were in the account. Husband subsequently paid Wife $9,000 for support while 
the parties were separated in October, November and December 1996 (Def Exhibit 
15), but these amounts were consumed by Wife and children for living expenses. (T 
186) As about $40,000 of other earned funds were deposited into the credit union 
account during this time, it cannot be said that it was Husband's inheritance which 
was paid to Wife and children for support. (PI Exhibit 25, 26) The court never 
ordered Husband to do anything with his inheritance and it was not shown that 
inherited funds went to Wife. Therefore, the trial court had no reason to offset 
Husband's duty to pay support with Husband's payment of marital debt before 
separation, particularly in light of Wife's sacrifice of her inheritance, and personal 
injury settlement. 
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VII. It Was Within the Trial Court's Discretion, and Supported by the 
Evidence, to Order Husband to Pay All Insurance Costs. 
The wording of § 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Annotated, cannot be used in 
isolation to deny the trial court discretion to reach an equitable ruling that Husband 
pay the entire costs of health and accident insurance for the children. In Ball v. 
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1012-1013 (Utah App. 1996) former husband argued that 
the literal wording of this section meant that former wife was not entitled to be 
reimbursed for insurance paid by former wife's spouse since such person was a "step-
parent" and not a parent as defined. This Court agreed that the wording of this 
section was clear, but also ruled that § 30-3-5(1) Utah Code Annotated trumps § 78-
45.7.15(3) by granting the trial court the "broad discretion" to make "equitable orders 
relating to the children, debts or obligations, and parties." Accordingly, the decree 
crediting former wife for former wife's husband's insurance payments on behalf of the 
children was upheld. 
Similarly here, the trial court's broad discretion under § 30-3-5 allowed the 
court to fashion its equitable remedy by ordering Husband to pay for all of the 
insurance. 
VIII. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees 
to Wife 
The trial court duly found that Husband had the ability to pay, and Wife lacked 
ability to pay, attorney's fees. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516-7 (Utah App. 
1996). The record is replete with evidence of Husband's high earnings ability and 
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Wife's lack thereof. (Facts H 11-21, 30-36) Husband manipulated and hid his income 
requiring Wife to go through the expense of proving such income. (Facts H 13-21) 
As a result of these efforts the trial court found that Husband was "not forthright and 
honest in his representations of what his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, 
and 1997." (Facts 1 26) The trial court also found that Husband was in willful 
contempt of court in failing to pay ordered support and in requiring Wife to make 
applications for relief. (Facts 1 41) 
Wife's fees came to $33,998.90. Wife and Wife's mother testified that of 
Wife's attorney's fees, $5,000 were paid from the $5,000 which had been received 
from the VA credit union account about the time the parties separated. Wife and 
Wife's mother further testified that $13,100 of Wife's fees had been paid through 
loans from Wife's mother. The $15,898.90 balance of attorney's fees were unpaid 
with Wife lacking the ability to pay same or to repay her mother. The correct amount 
of fees awarded should therefore have been at least $28,998.90 assuming credit for the 
$5,000 used by Wife from the VA credit union account. (Facts 1 43) Wife cross 
appeals for this difference in Point XIII infra. 
CROSS APPEAL ARGUMENT 
IX. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding Wife In Contempt 
Without any basis in pleading or evidence, the trial court found Wife in 
contempt of court for allegedly failing to allow visitation to Husband. (Facts \ 42) 
Husband did testify to a time period in October and November, 1996, where he had 
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not been able to see his children. (T 351) As this time period was prior to the 
December 13, 1996 filing date of this action (R. 1) and the January 27, 1997 initial 
hearing in which visitation was first established by order (R. 45), Petitioner did not 
spend any time contesting or explaining the issue.15 (R. 579 p. 21-22) Husband 
testified that "it took the first court appearance to get visitation rights" but never 
testified that he had been denied visitation thereafter. (T 351) Accordingly, there is 
no factual basis for a finding of contempt. 
Additionally, the finding of contempt against Wife was entered without first 
honoring Wife's due process/statutory right to prior specific notice of alleged 
contempt by affidavit as required by § 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated. Nor was Wife 
put on notice at the pre-trial or by any motion filed that she was allegedly in contempt 
of court and that a trial would consider such issue.16 Wife had no idea that a contempt 
finding was being considered and, accordingly, made no effort to address such risk. 
The finding of contempt represents complete surprise in violation of Wife's rights 
under § 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated, and the Due Process clauses of the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Bott v. Bott, 437 P.2d 684, 20 Utah 2d 
329 (1968), State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1228 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, the 
15This October - November, 1996 time period corresponded to the separation of the 
parties. Also, in mid-December, 1996 a protective order was entered against Husband 
wherein supervised visitation was initially ordered. Civil No. 964702002SA. 
16The issue of Husband's contempt was raised by Wife's affidavits and was 
specifically identified as an issue on the pre-trial order. No issue of any alleged contempt 
by Wife was reserved for trial in the pre-trial order. (R 299-201) 
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finding and judgment of contempt must be vacated. 
X. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Consider Overwhelming 
Evidence that Husband's Earnings Vastly Exceeded Deposits to His VA 
Credit Union Accounts. 
Wife challenges numerous rulings which stem from the trial court's failure to 
recognize that Husband's adjusted gross income which exceeded $200,000 per year. 
The trial court's rulings on alimony, child support and Husband's ability to contribute 
to private schooling were all erroneous. 
The trial court established an income for Husband by referring to Husband's 
deposits to his VA Credit Union checking and savings accounts for 1995, 1996 and 
1997. (Facts % 23) There are numerous problems with this approach. First, Husband 
from spring 1995 through date of trial was in a relationship with his patient/book 
keeper Laura Rogers and his deposited income did not match his billed and collected 
income. (Facts 1f1 11-22; Note 4 supra.) 
Second, the 1995 and 1996 credit union statements fail to account for known 
income which was deposited into the Zions Bank Account. An extra $6,000 of 
earnings was deposited in the Zions Bank account in 1995 and an extra $4,500 of 
earnings was deposited in the Zions account in 1996 by the time the parties separated. 
(Facts if 23) Third, the credit union account records failed to account for cash 
received and never deposited and for cash-back withheld from check deposits made by 
Husband. (Facts f 21) Fourth, the trial court accepted Husband's unsubstantiated 
claim that his income for 1997 was $105,314, at the same time the court found that 
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Husband was not being honest or forthright about his income and it was clear that 
Husband was deliberately holding down his income pending trial in the post-separation 
period.17 (Facts ifif 23-26) 
Fifth, and most significantly, the record was replete with evidence showing that 
Husband's gross revenues were in the $240,000 per year range rather than the 
$128,681 amount imputed by the court. The testimony of Frank Jensen of Medi-
Serve that Husband advised Jensen in early 1995 that Husband's revenues were 
$20,000 per month was uncontradicted. Mr. Jensen at that time agreed to accept 
Husband's billings on a seven percent commission, based upon that volume. Mr. 
Jensen's billings and collections thereafter reflected this level until Husband began to 
move his accounts to Laura Rogers. (Facts if 14-15) Even with accounts being 
diverted to Laura Rogers, Jensen's collections averaged $16,336 per month, an annual 
rate of $196,032. (Id.) (Facts if 15) 
Husband listed his monthly income at $20,000 per month on two different lines 
on an application for a Volvo automobile on October 2, 1995. (Facts if 16, PI Exhibit 
30) Husband admitted so listing his income, but claimed that he was confused about 
his income because Frank Jensen had erroneously told him that his income was 
$20,000. (T 379-380) However, by October 1995 most of Husband's accounts had 
17The parties separated in October, 1996. During 1997 and 1998 Husband refused 
to pay the alimony portion of his support obligation claiming lack of income. The trial 
court did not accept Husband's claims, held Husband in contempt of court and granted 
Wife judgment for $13,350 in unpaid temporary support. (Facts if 41) 
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been transferred to Laura Rogers with Husband having no reason at such time to have 
asked Mr. Jensen about Husband's current earnings. (PI Exhibit 29) 
Further, Husband's daily handwritten notebook entries between October 1995 
and Spring 1996 show average billings of $18,797.00 per month ($225,564 annual 
rate), during a time period when Husband's relationship with Laura Rogers was 
diverting Husband's attention from his practice. Deductions for commissions paid on 
Husband's Schedule C's and expense affidavits filed with the trial court also 
corresponded to an annual rate of collections by Laura Rogers alone between 
$184,615 and $188,400. (Facts ff 18, 19) These collections did not include other 
collections made by Husband directly, the payments which went into the Zions Bank 
account and accounts diverted from collection for up to one year. (Facts f 1f 12, 20, 
21) 
Husband testified that only Laura Rogers could explain his billings and 
collections. However, Husband also testified that he was terminating Ms. Rogers 
services and didn't know where she was although he had given her billings within a 
week prior to trial. (Facts % 22) Ms. Rogers avoided Wife's subpoena to appear at 
trial. (Id.) Husband testified that his practice was new and still in the growing phase. 
(Facts t 20) Medicare billings need not be billed for up to one year, allowing 
Husband to delay receiving income in 1997. (Facts f 21) 
Under this tide of evidence the trial court clearly abused its discretion in setting 
Husband's gross income at only $128,000 per year when Husband's gross income was 
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$240,000 per year. (Facts t 23) This dramatic difference in annual income needed to 
be accounted for before arriving at pre-tax income and considering living expenses. 
Further, the trial court erroneously set Husband's monthly business expenses at $3,333 
where Husband had little overhead and his legitimate Schedule C expenses for 1996 
and 1997 were less than $2,000 per month. (Facts t l 23-28) 
The matter therefore must be remanded for the trial court to consider 
Husband's actual income in its awards of child support and alimony. This additional 
income also requires that the trial court reconsider its ruling that Husband would not 
be required to assist in private schooling for the children. 
XI. The alimony/reimbursement alimony award was insufficient. 
The trial court's method of arriving at its alimony award failed to include 
consideration of tax consequences of alimony payments by Husband to Wife. (R. 369-
370, 478-479) Where the court ignored over nearly half of Husband's income, 
imputing Husband's income at only $128,000 per year, it was critical that Wife's 
support not be further limited by failure to consider that alimony was deductible to 
Husband and taxable to Wife. The alimony award must be increased after making 
such adjustment for a 25% to 30% federal and state income tax payable by Wife and 
35% to 40% deduction to Husband. (R. 376) At a post-trial hearing, the trial court 
stated that it assumed it had considered tax consequences in arriving at its award, but 
the court's ruling clearly failed to address such issue. (R 579, p. 14-15) If such was 
considered, then the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding more to Wife in 
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light of the tax consequences. 
Although the evidence was that Wife could not obtain an English teaching 
position and would need to attend college full time for two additional years, the trial 
court imputed $1,000 per month income to Wife. (Facts f 31) In light of the low 
imputed income to Husband and Wife's inability to return to teaching, the trial court 
either should not have imputed income to Wife for two years, or, upon doing so, 
should have recognized that Wife would need additional rehabilitation alimony for two 
years while Wife attended school and awarded rehabilitation alimony for such time 
period. The ruling left Wife without the means to return to college. 
Besides being inadequate in amount, the trial court's award of "a minimum 
period" of five years non-terminable reimbursement alimony is inadequate. Wife 
sacrificed over 13 years of near-poverty existence, sacrificed her teaching career and 
lost her opportunity to manage Husband's practice. (Facts ff 1-13, 30-36) 
Accordingly, the matter must be remanded with the minimum period of non-
terminable reimbursement alimony to be 13 years. 
XII. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Ordering Husband to Provide 
Security Under § 62 A-l 1-321 Utah Code Annotated 
Where Husband steadfastly refused to pay support as ordered and was found in 
contempt, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wife's request that Husband 
be ordered to provide security for support payments. §§ 62A-l 1-321 and 62A11-
303(18)(b), Utah Code Annotated, set forth in Addendum A, provide that security may 
be required where there is a combined support obligation for alimony and child 
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support. Wife filed a verified motion notifying Husband that this relief would be 
requested at trial. (R. 245-246) Wife and the children clearly required the assistance 
of such an order to assure timely receipt of support. (Facts f 41) 
The trial court declined to grant such request stating that contempt powers were 
sufficient threat. However, the trial court, although finding Husband in contempt, 
stayed Husband's five day jail sentence and left Husband with minimal anxiety of the 
consequences of deliberate contempt. Further, the purpose of the security requirement 
is to assure timely payment of support, whereas contempt sanctions often deal only 
with partially remedying the past. Given Husband's course of conduct the trial court 
should have imposed the bond requirement. 
XIII. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Awarding Wife All of Her 
Attorney's Fees 
Although Wife's attorney's fees through trial came to $33,998.90 the trial court 
awarded Wife only $20,000 in attorney's fees. Wife acknowledges that $5,000 from 
the parties' bank account was used by Wife for attorney's fees. After considering 
such, however, Wife should have been awarded $28,998.90. 
As shown in Point VIII supra., the evidence was clear that Husband had the 
means to pay for Wife's attorney's fees and that Wife did not. (Facts % 43) The trial 
court made no finding that Wife's attorney's fees were excessive, and considering 
Wife's burden of proving Husband's income, such fees were clearly appropriate. It is 
an abuse of discretion to award less than the claimed amount of attorney's fees without 
reasonable justification. The trial court must explain a sua sponte reduction to allow 
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meaningful review. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990), Bell 
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) Absent explanation, the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to award the entire $28,998.90 amount of Wife's 
attorney's fees. 
Further, the case centered around Husband's ability to pay support. The trial 
court declined Wife's post trial request that the trial court certify its award of 
attorney's fees as being in the nature of support to assure they could not discharged in 
a bankruptcy filing. The trial court stated that the matter could be dealt with at such 
time as a bankruptcy filing might occur and declined to consider the matter. (R 579, 
p. 8-9) As Wife's attorney's fees clearly were incurred to establish support for herself 
and her children the court abused its discretion in failing to designate the attorney's 
fees award in the nature of support. 
XIV. Wife must be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. 
Husband has filed an appeal and not marshaled the evidence leaving the expense 
of such burden to Wife. Wife is entitled to recover her attorney's fees on appeal. 
Bell at 494. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order finding Wife in Contempt must be reversed. Based upon 
the evidence this Court should increase child support and alimony awards in 
accordance with Husband's adjusted gross income of over $200,000 per year and 
order Husband to pay private schooling for the children, or the case must be remanded 
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for the trial court to reconsider and increase child support and alimony awards and to 
re-address the private schooling issue. Reimbursement alimony must extend to 
thirteen years, the length of the marriage. If Husband's higher earnings are not to be 
recognized, despite the overwhelming evidence, the matter must be remanded for the 
trial court to adjust alimony to account for Husband's tax deduction and Wife's 
inclusion of taxable income and to reconsider either removing the income imputed to 
Wife or granting Wife rehabilitation alimony. 
The trial court should also be instructed to require Husband to provide security 
for payment of his child support and alimony obligations and to award Wife all of her 
attorney's fees, including Wife's fees incurred during this appeal. The judgment for 
Wife's attorney's fees should be declared to be in the nature of support. 
DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of February, 1999. 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to 
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Attorney at Law 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 
Title 62A-11-303, Utah Code Annotated 
Title 62A-11-321, Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78-45-7.15, Utah Code Annotated 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article 1, § 7, Utah Constitution 
EXHIBIT B Ruling 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
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EXHIBIT A 
UT ST § 3 0-3-5, Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care 
of parties and children--Division of debts--Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction--Custody and visitation--Determination of 
alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Page 1 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-
Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children—Division of debts—Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction-
Custody and visitation—Determination 
of alimony—Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a 
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is 
responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties 
contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these 
orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order 
determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of 
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
If the court determines that the circumstances 
are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include 
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of 
parents, grandparents, and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the 
need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court 
ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care 
of parties and children--Division of debts--Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction--Custody and visitation--Determination of 
alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Page 2 
custody or visitation provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, the court shall order the 
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party m that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was 
without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial 
noncompliance with a visitation order by a 
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the 
immediate family pursuant to Section 
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by 
the prevailing party because of the other parly's 
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation. 
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(I) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(in) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(IV) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the 
parties m determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to 
the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves 
on the threshold of a major change m the 
income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment m dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a 
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(n) The court may not modify alimony or issue 
a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(in) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided m this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living 
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expenses. annulment and his rights are determined. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that 
the former spouse is cohabitatmg with another 
person. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c 284, Laws 1995, c 330, § 1, 
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1997, c 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c 330 provides 
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of 
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in 
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in 
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose " 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 62A-l 1-303 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 62A. HUMAN SERVICES 
CODE 
CHAPTER 11. RECOVERY 
SERVICES 
PART 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF 
CHILDREN 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 62A-11-303. Definitions 
As used m this part: 
(1) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an action 
or proceeding of the office conducted in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
(2) "Administrative order" means an order that 
has been issued by the office, the department, or 
an administrative agency of another state or 
other comparable jurisdiction with similar 
authority to that of the office. 
(3) "Assistance" or "public assistance" is 
defined m Section 62A-l 1-103. 
(4) "Business day" means a day on which state 
offices are open for regular business. 
(5) Child means: 
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years 
who is not otherwise emancipated, self-
supporting, married, or a member of the armed 
forces of the United States; 
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, 
while enrolled in high school during the normal 
and expected year of graduation and not 
otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No 
married, or a member of the armed forces of the 
United States; or 
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is 
incapacitated from earning a living and is 
without sufficient means. 
(6) "Child support" is defined in Section 
62 A-l 1-401. 
(7) "Child support guidelines" or "guidelines" 
is defined m Section 78-45-2. 
(8) "Child support order" or "support order" is 
defined in Section 62A-l 1-401. 
(9) "Court order" means a judgment or order 
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction of this 
state, another state, the federal government, or 
any other comparable jurisdiction issued under 
Section 30-3-5, Section 78-3a-906, Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, or other 
statute relating to support. 
(10) "Director" means the director of the 
Office of Recovery Services. 
(11) "Disposable earnings" is defined m 
Section 62A-11-103. 
(12) "Income" is defined m Section 
62A-11-103. 
(13) "IV-D" is defined m Section 62A-l 1-103. 
(14) "Notice of agency action" means the 
notice required to commence an adjudicative 
proceeding m accordance with Section 
63-46b-3. 
*19245 (15) "Obligee" means an individual, 
this state, another state, or corporate jurisdiction 
to whom a duty of child support is owed, or who 
is entitled to reimbursement of child support or 
public assistance. 
(16) "Obligor" means a person, firm, 
corporation, or the estate of a decedent owing a 
duty of support to this state, to an individual, to 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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another state, or other corporate jurisdiction in 
whose behalf this state is acting. 
(17) "Office" is defined in Section 
62A-11-103. 
(18) Parent means a natural parent, an adoptive 
parent, or stepparent of a dependent child. 
(19) "Person" includes an individual, firm, 
corporation, association, political subdivision, 
department, or office. 
(20) "Presiding officer" means a presiding 
officer described in Section 63-46b-2. 
(21) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially 
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial 
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive 
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive 
custodial parent as a common law spouse, 
whose common law marriage was entered into 
in a state which recognizes the validity of 
common law marriage. 
(22) "Support" includes past-due, present, and 
future obligations established by: 
(a) a court or administrative order or imposed 
by law for the financial support, maintenance, 
health, or dental care of a dependent child; and 
(b) a court or administrative order for the 
financial support of a spouse or former spouse 
with whom the obligor's dependent child resides 
if the obligor also owes a child support 
obligation that is being enforced by the state. 
(23) "Support debt," "past-due support," or 
"arrears" means the debt created by nonpayment 
of support. 
Amended by Laws 1992, c 160, Laws 1995, c 258, § 7, 
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1996, c 1, § 16, eff Jan 31, 1996, 
Laws 1997, c 232, § 32, eff July 1, 1997 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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debt--Procedure 
Utah Code § 62A-11-321 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 62A. HUMAN SERVICES 
CODE 
CHAPTER 11. RECOVERY 
SERVICES 
PART 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF 
CHILDREN 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 62A-11-321. Posting bond or security 
for payment of support debt-
Procedure 
(1) The office shall, or an obligee may, 
petition the court for an order requiring an 
obligor to post a bond or provide other security 
for the payment of a support debt, if the office 
or an obligee determines that action is 
appropriate, and if the payments are more than 
90 days delinquent. The office shall establish 
rules for determining when it shall seek an order 
for bond or other security. 
(2) When the office or an obligee petitions the 
court under this section, it shall give written 
notice to the obligor, stating: 
(a) the amount of support debt; 
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order 
requiring the obligor to post security; and 
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear 
before the court and contest the office's or 
obligee's petition. 
(3) After notice to the obligor and an 
opportunity for a hearing, the court shall order a 
bond posted or other security to be deposited 
upon the office's or obligee's showing of a 
support debt and of a reasonable basis for the 
security. 
As enacted by Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1988 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 78-2a-3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PARTI. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF 
APPEALS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(I) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 
C o p y r i g h t (c) West Group 1998 No 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record m criminal cases, except those involving 
a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record m criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal 
sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
*25945 (I) appeals from the Utah Military 
Court; and 
(]) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion 
only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with 
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c 13, Laws 1995, c 299, § 47, 
c l a i m t o o r i g i n a l U . S . Govt , works 
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eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19, eff July 1, 
1996; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49, eff July 1, 1996. 
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Utah Code § 78-32-3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR 
PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 32. CONTEMPT 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; 
summary action—Without immediate 
presence; procedure 
When a contempt is committed in the 
immediate view and presence of the court, or 
judge at chambers, it may be punished 
summarily, for which an order must be made, 
reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate 
view and presence, adjudging that the person 
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a 
contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed 
in section 78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt 
is not committed in the immediate view and 
presence of the court or judge at chambers, an 
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge 
of the facts constituting the contempt, or a 
statement of the facts by the referees or 
arbitrators or other judicial officers. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 78-45-7.15 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR 
PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 45. UNIFORM CIVIL 
LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 78-45-7.15. Medical expenses 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the 
medical expenses of the minor children be 
provided by a parent if it is available at a 
reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be 
ordered to maintain insurance for medical 
expenses, the court or administrative agency 
may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share 
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's 
portion of insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a 
per capita share of the premium actually paid. 
Page 1 
The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy 
and multiplying the result by the number of 
children m the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share 
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical expenses, including deductibles and 
copayments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance 
shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery 
Services under Title IV of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, and 
thereafter on or before January 2 of each 
calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under 
Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium, or benefits withm 30 calendar 
days of the date he first knew or should have 
known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses 
shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent 
withm 30 days of payment. 
*27045 (8) In addition to any other sanctions 
provided by the court, a parent incurring 
medical expenses may be denied the right to 
receive credit for the expenses or to recover the 
other parent's share of the expenses if that 
parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and 
(7). 
Added by Laws 1994, c 118 Amended by Laws 1995, c 
258, § 14, eff May 1, 1995 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law G=> 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec, 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law ®=> 82; 
Weapons ®=> 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
EXHIBIT B 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, 
Defendant, 
RULING 
Case No. 964701989 
JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
This matter came before the court for trial on February 6, 1998 and was taken 
under advisement to allow the Defendant to provide Form 1099s for the calendar year 1997. 
The Court had these documents faxed to it on March 3, 1998. The Court having considered 
the testimony of the parties and the evidence presented at the time of trial and on March 3, 
1998, now enters the following findings and order: 
1. Both parties were residents of Davis County at least three months prior to the 
filing of the complaint and service of process was accomplished pursuant to the law. This 
court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this case. 
2. The parties were married on June 22, 1984 and have remained husband and 
wife to the present. The parties have experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will 
award a decree of divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The following are minor children born of this marriage: Heather Erinne, born 
Nov. 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. 
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The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner should exercise the primary physical care of the 
minor children and the Court will enter an order to that effect. The Respondent petitions the 
Court for joint legal custody of the minor children. The Court finds that it is not in the best 
interest of these children to have joint legal custody in the parties. The parties have not 
demonstrated the ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in the best 
interest of the minor children. However, the Respondent is entitled to all of the statutory 
benefits of being a noncustodial parent and the Court will direct counsel for the Petitioner to 
incorporate into the decree of divorce all of those statutory benefits and rights. 
4. The Respondent is entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with the minor 
children and the Court will order that at a minimum he should receive the standard rights of 
visitation as set forth in the statute. Even though the minor child Kevyn is not quite three 
years old, the Court will order that the Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as 
he does the older children and that is the standard visitation for children over five. All of the 
statutory rights and responsibilities pertaining to visitation shall be set forth in the decree. 
5. The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-half of the actually incurred 
day care expenses when the custodial parent is working. Those expenses must be reasonable 
as compared to day care services generally. The noncustodial parent is entitled pursuant to the 
statute to provide day care if he is available on a regular basis to do so. If the Petitioner 
pursues her education to get a teaching certificate, the Respondent is ordered to reimburse one 
half of the day care which is incurred as a result of her taking college courses. 
6. The Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a private school. The Court 
finds that there will not be excess resources on either side and that private school is a luxury 
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and not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will not order the noncustodial 
parent to be responsible for one half of any private school tuition or books. If the Petitioner 
determines to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the knowledge that she 
would be paying all of the costs. 
7. The Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children. The Court having considered the financial circumstances and 
abilities of the parties relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that the 
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be entitled to any 
offset against child support for that premium. However, the parties will each be responsible 
for one half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. Counsel for 
Petitioner is directed to put in the decree the statutory language regarding the reimbursement 
of medical expenses. 
8. The Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance policy of a minimum of 
$100, 000.00, with the minor children named as beneficiaries. In the event of the 
Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor 
children. 
9. The Court has the obligation to determine the Respondent's income in this case. 
Evidence was presented to show that during 1995 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU 
account $143,124.18. However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C that his gross 
receipts were $80,677. For the calendar year 1996 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU 
account $137,606.98. (This figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and 
subtracting $89,000 inheritance he received that year). During the trial the Respondent 
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provided the Court with Exhibit 3 which contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which 
showed deposits of $124,415.69. In addition to that, the Court received as evidence 
Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that year he reports gross 
receipts of $97,549. For calendar year 1997 the Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his 
total earning deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21. However, he has provided the Court with 
the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total income of $94,471.35. The Court notes 
there are discrepancies in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his 
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits for 1995 and 1996. The 
Court finds that the Respondent is not being forthright and honest in his representation of what 
his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Court is going to calculate the 
Respondent's income by the following method. The Court will take the average of the 1995 
deposit of $143,124 and the 1996 deposits of $137,606 and the Respondent's representation of 
his 1997 deposits of $105, 314. The average of those three years the Court calculates being 
$128,681. Now, the Respondent is entitled to reasonable expenses to operate his business. 
The Court having examined the expenses of the Respondent as he has related them on his tax 
return and having considered his testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his 
expenses in the tax returns. The Court will find that reasonable expenses for the Respondent 
are $40,000 per year. Taking the imputed gross receipts of $128, 681 less the $40,000 
expenses, the Court finds that the Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child 
support and alimony is $88,681 or $7390 per month. 
10. The Petitioner is entitled to receive and the Respondent is ordered to pay child 
support pursuant to the guidelines using an income for Respondent of $7390 and imputing to 
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the Petitioner $1000 per month. The Court imputes income to the Petitioner because she has a 
Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the ability to work and to earn 
income of at least $1000 per month. Using the guidelines, the Court finds that child support 
would be $1482 per month. The Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the 
month of February 1998. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare a child support 
worksheet using the figures of $7390 for the Respondent and $1000 for the Petitioner and the 
resulting number if it should be different from the calculation of the Court would be the 
amount ordered for child support. 
11. The Petitioner has reasonable minimum expenses in the amount of $4000 per 
month. The Court finds she has the ability to make $1000 per month which would calculate to 
approximately $750 in net income that she can generate on her own. That leaves expenses to 
be covered of $3250. She has a child support award of $1482 per month which would leave 
the amount of $1768 in expenses that would not be covered by her income or child support. 
The Petitioner has a need for alimony. The Respondent has a gross monthly income for 
purposes of calculating alimony of $7390 per month. After taxes, the Court finds that he has a 
net income of approximately $5500 and reasonable expenses of $2500 per month. This leaves 
the Respondent with the ability to pay approximately $3000 per month toward child support 
and alimony. He is ordered to pay $1482 per month in child support, which leaves $1518 
which he has the ability to pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony. Based on the need of the 
Petitioner and the ability of the Respondent to pay, the Court will order that Respondent pay to 
Petitioner $1518 per month in alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13 
years. The Court finds that the Petitioner has made significant sacrifice during the term of the 
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marriage as the Respondent has pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training. The 
Respondent's degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due to some extent 
to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. The Respondent will benefit hereafter until 
he retires and the Court finds that it is appropriate that the Petitioner benefit from her efforts 
and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years. The Court will term this minimum period 
of alimony as reimbursement alimony. Alimony shall terminate after five years upon the 
remarriage or cohabitation of the Petitioner. 
12. In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate in this case to likewise make 
a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property. The parties have acquired a home 
in Layton, Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300 and a mortgage balance of $91,258. 
The equity of the parties in that real property is $27,042. The Court finds it equitable to 
award Petitioner the marital home, and the entire equity in the home. The Court 
acknowledges that $6000 came from Respondent's grandfather and was used as the down 
payment for the purchase of the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6000 
to have been a gift to both parties. The Petitioner will be responsible for paying the mortgage 
payment and hold the Respondent harmless in the event of her nonpayment. 
13. The parties have acquired certain personal property during the term of the 
marriage. The Court will award the property that is currently in the possession of each party 
to that party except as hereafter noted. The Court finds that the Petitioner has certain items of 
personal property that are the Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the 
Respondent as soon as possible. Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique 
hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and wagon. In addition, the 
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Petitioner is to give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied. The Court notes 
that Respondent may have real property that was gifted to him and will order that the 
Petitioner have no interest in any real property that he may own separately. The Court awards 
to the Petitioner her automobile and to the Respondent his two automobiles. 
14. The parties have acquired certain debts and obligations during the term of 
their marriage. The Court will order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. In addition, the Court will order that the Respondent be 
responsible for his student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
15. Each party will be responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns 
for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and 
the oldest child to the Petitioner and will award the exemption for the middle child to the 
Respondent. 
16. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party 
interfering with the credit or accounts of the other party. 
17. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party 
harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other except for purposes of 
exercising visitation. 
18. The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in his alimony and child 
support obligation through the month of January 1997 in the amount of $13,350. The Court 
will enter a judgment against the Respondent on behalf of the Petitioner in that amount. The 
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the ability to pay each and every 
month and that is why the arrearage. The Court finds that during the period that the 
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Respondent was ordered to pay that he purchased two automobiles of which he only needed 
one and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary. The Court will find that he 
had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully 
violated the order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt. The Court will order 
that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on condition that 
he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future. In addition, the Court will award some 
attorney's fees that will be calculated later. 
19. The Petitioner had an ongoing responsibility to provide the Respondent with 
visitation with the minor children. The Court finds that the Petitioner wilfully violated the 
order of the Court in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will find her in 
contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in the Davis County Jail. The Court will 
suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future. 
20. The parties each have had to incur substantial attorneys' fees in this matter to 
get the case to trial. The Court will find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that the Petitioner, with her limited income and resources, 
does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees. The Court will find that reasonable 
attorney's fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular case is $20,000. 
The Court finds that while Petitioner does not have the ability to pay these fees that the 
Respondent does have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will enter a 
judgment against him on behalf of the Petitioner in the amount of $20,000 for attorney's fees. 
21. It is the understanding of the Court that neither party has any retirement 
benefits and thus there would be nothing to share pursuant to Woodward. 
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22. Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the execution of any documents 
necessary to finalize this order, or for property distribution, custody, visitation, and child 
support under the terms of this divorce decree. 
23. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare an order consistent with this 
ruling. 
Dated this 26th day of March 1998 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALI0>HIN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the attached RULING was mailed by First Class postage to the 
individuals listed below on 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
311 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful UT 84010 
BY THE COURT, 
Deputy Clerk 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #23 31 
Attorney for Petitioner 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 2 98-72 00 
Fax: (801) 298-8950 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE JOHNSON, ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 964701989DA 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, ) 
Respondent. ) JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February, 
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding. 
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen, 
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and 
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record. 
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and now 
being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both parties are residents of Davis County at least 
three (3) months prior to the filing of the Complaint and service 
of process was accomplished pursuant to the law. The Court finds 
that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of 
the case. 
2. The parties were married on June 22, 1984, and have 
remained husband and wife to the present. The parties have 
experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will award a 
Decree of Divorce to become final upon entry. 
3. The following are minor children born of this 
marriage: Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, 
born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. The 
parties have stipulated that Petitioner should exercise the primary 
physical care of the minor children and the Court will enter an 
order to that effect. Respondent petitions the Court for joint 
legal custody of the minor children. The Court finds that it is 
not in the best interest of these children to have joint legal 
custody in the parties. The parties have not demonstrated the 
ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in 
the best interest of the minor children. However, pursuant to § 
30-3-33 Utah Code Annotated, Respondent is entitled to all 
statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial parent, which 
shall include the following: 
a. Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports 
and community functions in which the children are participating or 
being honored, and Respondent shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; 
b. Respondent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and day care reports and medical 
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent 
in the event of a medical emergency; 
c. Each parent shall provide the other with their 
current address and telephone number at this time and within 24 
hours of any change; 
d. Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail 
privileges with the children; 
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e. Parental care shall be presumed to be better 
care for the children than surrogate care and the Court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing Respondent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
f. Each parent shall provide all surrogate care 
providers with the name, current address, and telephone number of 
the other parent and shall provide each other with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care 
providers unless the Court for good cause orders otherwise; 
4. Respondent is entitled to reasonable rights of 
visitation with the minor children and the Court will order that at 
a minimum he should receive the standard rights of visitation as 
set forth in the statute. Even though the minor child Kevyn is not 
quite three years old, the Court will order that Respondent have 
the same visitation rights with her as he does the older children 
and that is the standard visitation for children over five. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation shall be as 
follows: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m.; 
(b) Alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled 
school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for 
the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
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(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday 
or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that 
time so that the child is free from school and the parent is 
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to 
this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or 
after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school 
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as 
the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
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(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for 
the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, 
commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas 
school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
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(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial 
parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option 
of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject 
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical 
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, 
the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours 
and for reasonable duration. 
5. The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-
half of the actually incurred day care expenses when the custodial 
parent is working. Those expenses must be reasonable as compared 
to day care services generally. The non-custodial parent is 
entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day care if he is 
available on a regular basis to do so. If Petitioner pursues her 
education to get a teaching certificate in an area other than 
English or to obtain another degree requiring similar schooling, 
Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the day care which 
is incurred as a result thereof.— &*UA* JJ^^ /^I^V^wx sfafH-e M$^*&vP 
U44^ trf&U^ "7%*^. %*%&£-<• ffa,^ 
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6. Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a 
private school. The Court finds that there will not be excess 
resources on either side and that private school is a luxury and 
not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will 
not order the non-custodial parent to be responsible for one-half 
of any private school tuition or books. If Petitioner determines 
to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the 
knowledge that she would be paying all of those costs. 
7. Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children. The Court having 
considered the financial circumstances and abilities of the parties 
relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that 
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he 
will not be entitled to any offset against child support for that 
premium. However, the parties will each be responsible for one-
half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. 
Pursuant to § 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be 
ordered to provide written notification of the cost and payment of 
medical expenses to Respondent within 3 0 days of payment. 
Respondent should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his one-
half of those expenses within 15 days after receiving notification. 
8. Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance 
policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor children named 
as exclusive beneficiaries. In the event of the Respondent's death 
the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor 
children. Respondent is ordered to provide proof of maintenance of 
such insurance to Petitioner. 
9. The Court has the obligation to determine 
Respondent's income in this case. Evidence was presented to show 
that during 1995 Respondent deposited in his VAMCU account 
$143,124.18. However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C 
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that his gross receipts were $80,677.00. For the calendar year 
1996 Respondent deposited in his VAMCU account $137,606.98. (This 
figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and 
subtracting $89,000.00 inheritance he received that year). During 
the trial Respondent provided the Court with Exhibit 3 which 
contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which showed deposits of 
$124,415.69. In addition to that, the Court received as evidence 
Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that 
year he reports gross receipts of $97,549.00. For calendar year 
1997 Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his total earning 
deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21. However, he has provided the 
Court with the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total 
income of $94,471.35. The Court notes there are discrepancies in 
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his 
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits 
for 1995 and 1996. The Court finds that Respondent is not being 
forthright and honest in his representation of what his income has 
been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Court is going to 
calculate the Respondent's income by the following method. The 
Court will take the average of the 1995 deposit of $143,124.00 and 
the 1996 deposits of $137,606.00 and the Respondent's 
representation of his 1997 deposits of $105,314.00. The average of 
those three years the Court calculates being $128,681.00. Now, 
Respondent is entitled to reasonable expenses to operate his 
business. The Court having examined the expenses of Respondent as 
he has related them on his tax return and having considered his 
testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his expenses 
in the tax returns. The Court finds that reasonable expenses for 
Respondent are $40,000.00 per year. Taking the imputed gross 
receipts of $128,681.00 less the $40,000.00 expenses, the Court 
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finds that Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child 
support and alimony is $88,681.00 or $7,390.00 per month. 
10. Petitioner is entitled to receive and Respondent is 
ordered to pay child support pursuant to the guidelines using an 
income for Respondent of $7,3 90.00 and imputing to Petitioner 
$1,000.00. The Court imputes income to Petitioner because she has 
a Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the 
ability to work and to earn income of at least $1,000.00 per month. 
The Court finds that child support would be $1,482.00 per month. 
Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the month 
of February 1998. 
11. Petitioner has reasonable monthly expenses in the 
amount of $4,000.00 per month. The Court finds that she has the 
ability to make $1,000.00 per month which would calculate to 
approximately $750.00 in net income that she can generate on her 
own. That leaves expenses to be covered of $3,2 50.00. She has a 
child support award of $1,438.00 per month which would leave the 
amount of $1,768.00 in expenses that would not be covered by her 
income or child support. Petitioner has a need for alimony. 
Respondent has a gross monthly income for purposes of calculating 
alimony of $7,390.00 per month. After taxes, the Court finds that 
he has a net income of approximately $5,500.00 and reasonable 
expenses of $2,500.00 per month. This leaves Respondent with the 
ability to pay approximately $3,000.00 per month toward child 
support and alimony. He is ordered to pay $1,482.00 per month in 
child support, which leaves $1,518.00 which he has the ability to 
pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony. Based on the need of 
Petitioner and the ability of Respondent to pay, the Court will 
order that Respondent pay to Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in 
alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13 years. The 
court approves the amount of child support ordered knowing that 
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such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set forth on the 
table. The Court finds that Petitioner has made significant 
sacrifice during the terms of the marriage as the Respondent has 
pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training. Respondent's 
degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due 
to some extent to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. 
Respondent will benefit hereafter until he retires and the Court 
finds that it is appropriate that Petitioner benefit from her 
efforts and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years. The 
Court will term this minimum period of alimony as reimbursement 
alimony. Alimony shall terminate after five years upon the 
remarriage or cohabitation of Petitioner. 
12. In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate 
in this case to likewise make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property. The parties have acquired a home in Layton, 
Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300.00 and a mortgage 
balance of $92,258.00. The equity of the parties in that real 
property is $27,042.00. The Court finds it equitable to award 
Petitioner the martial home, and the entire equity in the home. 
The Court acknowledges that $6,000.00 came from Respondent's 
grandfather and was used as the down payment for the purchase of 
the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6,000.00 
to have been a gift to both parties. Petitioner will be 
responsible for paying the mortgage payment and hold the Respondent 
harmless in the event of her nonpayment. 
13. The parties have acquired certain personal property 
during the term of the marriage. The Court will award the property 
that is currently in the possession of each party to that party 
except as hereafter noted. The Court finds that Petitioner has 
certain items of personal property that are Respondent's and she 
should transfer that property to the Respondent as soon as 
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possible. Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique 
hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and 
wagon. In addition, Petitioner is to give Respondent access to 
family photos that may be copied. The Court notes that Respondent 
may have real property that was gifted to him by his family and 
will order that the Petitioner have no interest in any real 
property that he may own separately. The Court awards to 
Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two automobiles. 
14. The parties have acquired certain debts and 
obligations during the term of their marriage. The Court will 
order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. Following the parties' 
separation in October 1996, Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39 
to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to 
Petitioner and for clothes purchased by Respondent's use. 
Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest 
accrued thereon which was $971.12 as of date of trial. In addition, 
the Court will order that Respondent be responsible for his student 
loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
15. Each party will be responsible for the filing of 
their own separate tax returns for the years 1996 and 1997. The 
Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and the 
oldest child to Petitioner and will award the exemption for the 
middle child to Respondent. 
16. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction 
against either party interfering with credit or accounts of the 
other party. 
17. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction 
against either party from harming, harassing, going to the home or 
work place of the other except for purposes of exercising 
visitation. 
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18. The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in 
his alimony and child support obligation through the month of 
January 1997 in the amount of $13,350.00. The Court will enter a 
judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in that amount. 
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the 
ability to pay each and every month and that is why the arrearage. 
The Court finds that during the period that Respondent was ordered 
to pay that he leased two automobiles of which he only needed one 
and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary. The 
Court will find that he had the ability to pay the amount that he 
was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully violated the 
order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt. The 
Court will order that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail 
but will suspend the jail time on condition that he strictly follow 
the orders of the Court in the future. In addition, the Court will 
award some attorney's fees that will be calculated later. 
19. Petitioner has an ongoing responsibility to provide 
Respondent with visitation with the minor children. The Court 
finds that Petitioner has willfully violated the order of the Court 
in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will 
find her in contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in 
the Davis County Jail. The Court will suspend the jail time on 
condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the 
future. 
20. The parties each have had to incur substantial 
attorney's fees in this matter to get the case to trial. The Court 
will find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that Petitioner, with her 
limited income and resources, does not have the ability to pay her 
attorney's fees. The Court will find that reasonable attorney's 
fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular 
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case is $20,000.00. The Court finds that while Petitioner does not 
have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will 
enter a judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in the 
amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees. 
21. It is the understanding of the Court that neither 
party has any retirement benefits and thus there would be nothing 
to share pursuant to Woodward. 
22. Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the 
execution of any documents necessary to finalize this order, or for 
property distribution, custody, visitation, and child support under 
the terms of the divorce decree. 
23. Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 set forth $847.81 in child 
medical expenses as of date of trial. On June 29, 1998, Respondent 
paid to Petitioner the amount of $423.90 which represents full 
payment of Respondent's one-half of the medical expenses owed as of 
trial. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. DIVORCE GRANTED: Petitioner should be awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony presently existing between the parties. Such Decree 
should become final on entry upon the records of the Court. 
B. CUSTODY, SUPPORT, ALIMONY AND VISITATION: The 
custody of and visitation with the parties' minor children, the 
child support, and the alimony should be ordered in accordance with 
the Findings herein. 
C. DEBTS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: In making the 
alimony and child support findings above, the Court has taken into 
account the allocation of debts, the distribution of property, and 
13 
the insurance provisions contained herein; each such item should be 
ordered in accordance with those Findings. 
D. MISCELLANEOUS: The costs and attorney's fees, life 
insurance, health insurance and other miscellaneous provisions 
should be ordered in accordance with the Findings herein. 
DATED this JS **"day of July, 1998. 
MICHAEL O/ALLPI 
District ^ Judge 
RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual, 
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this % ^ ^ day of July, 1998. The undersigned 
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at 
the expiration of the appropriate time. 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #2331 
Attorney for Petitioner 
380 North 200 West, #260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
Fax: (801) 298-8950 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE JOHNSON, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 964701989DA 
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February, 
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding. 
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen, 
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and 
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record. 
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and 
being fully advised in the premises and having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, makes 
and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. DIVORCE GRANTED: Petitioner is hereby granted a 
Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby severing the bonds of 
matrimony heretofore existing between the parties. Said Decree to 
become final upon entry in the official records of the clerk of 
Davis County, State of Utah, automatically and without further 
action by the parties. JUDGMENT ENTERED 
BY \\^ 
2. CUSTODY: Petitioner is awarded the sole care, 
custody and control of the following minor children born of this 
marriage: Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, 
born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995. 
However, pursuant to § 30-3-33 Utah Code Annotated, Respondent is 
entitled to all statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial 
parent, which shall include the following: 
(a) Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, 
sports and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and Respondent shall be 
entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(b) Respondent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and day care reports and 
medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(c) Each parent shall provide the other with their 
current address and telephone number at this time and within 
24 hours of any change; 
(d) Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail 
privileges with the children; 
(e) Parental care shall be presumed to be better 
care for the children than surrogate care and the Court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing Respondent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(f) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care 
providers with the name, current address, and telephone number 
of the other parent and shall provide each other with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate 
care providers unless the Court for good cause orders 
otherwise. 
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3. VISITATION: Respondent is entitled to reasonable 
rights of visitation with the minor children and the Court orders 
that at a minimum he should receive the standard rights of 
visitation as set forth in the statute. Even though the minor 
child Kevyn is not quite three years old, the Court will order that 
Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as he does the 
older children and that is the standard visitation for children 
over five. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation 
shall be as follows: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m. ; 
(b) Alternating weekends beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled 
school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for 
the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday 
or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that 
time so that the child is free from school and the parent is 
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to 
this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or 
after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
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(ii) Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school 
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as 
the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the 
noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for 
the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
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(v) the fall school break, if applicable, 
commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas 
school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial 
parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option 
of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject 
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical 
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
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(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, 
the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours 
and for reasonable duration. 
4. DAY CARE EXPENSES: The parties are ordered to be 
responsible for one-half of the actually incurred day care expenses 
when the custodial parent is working. Those expenses must be 
reasonable as compared to day care services generally. The non-
custodial parent is entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day 
care if he is available on a regular basis to do so. If Petitioner 
pursues her education to get a teaching certificate in an area 
other than English or to obtain another degree requiring similar 
schooling, Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the, day 
care which is incurred as a result thereof. /%C^¥^v ty*** ^ — ^ , ^x, - ^  
5. PRIVATE SCHOOL: Petitioner shalSTbe responsible f o r ^ & > > ^ ^ 
all costs associated with the children's enrollment in private z*+*£/**t^ 
school, if she chooses to enroll the children in a private school. 
6. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE: Respondent is 
ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the benefit of 
the minor children. The Court having considered the financial 
circumstances and abilities of the parties relating to the payment 
of the insurance premium orders that Respondent shall be 
responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be 
entitled to any offset against child support for that premium. 
However, the parties will each be responsible for one-half of the 
non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. Pursuant to 
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§ 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be ordered to 
provide written notification of the cost and payment of medical 
expenses to Respondent within 3 0 days of payment. Respondent 
should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his one-half of those 
expenses within 15 days after receiving notification. 
7. LIFE INSURANCE: Respondent is directed to maintain 
a life insurance policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor 
children named as exclusive beneficiaries. In the event of the 
Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the 
support of the minor children. Respondent is ordered to provide 
proof of maintenance of such insurance to Petitioner. 
8. CHILD SUPPORT: On the basis of Respondent's income 
of approximately $7,390.00 per month, Petitioner's imputed earnings 
of approximately $1,000.00 per month, and further as consideration 
for the other aspects of the property settlement, debt allocation 
and insurance provisions contained herein, Respondent should be 
ordered to pay to Petitioner as and for child support during the 
minority of the parties' children and through their graduation from 
high school, whichever is later, the sum of $1,482.00 per month 
commencing on the Fifth day of February, 1998, and payable in equal 
installments on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month 
thereafter. The Court approves the amount of child support ordered 
knowing that such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set 
forth on the table. 
9. ALIMONY: Based upon the need of Petitioner and the 
ability of Respondent to pay, Respondent is ordered to pay to 
Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in alimony for a minimum of five 
years and a maximum of 13 years. The Court will term this minimum 
period of alimony as reimbursement alimony. Alimony shall 
terminate after five years upon the remarriage or cohabitation of 
Petitioner. Said alimony payment shall commence on the Fifth day 
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of February, 1998, and payable in equal installments on the Fifth 
and Twentieth days of each month thereafter. 
10. REAL PROPERTY: In consideration for the child 
support, alimony, debt allocation, and other provisions in this 
action, the real property of the marriage is awarded and allocated 
as follows: 
A. PETITIONER is awarded all right title and 
interest in the marital residence located at 946 North 1500 East, 
Layton, Utah 84041 and more particularly described as: 
All of Lot 17, Roueche Hills Subdivision, No. 
2, A subdivision of part of Section 22, 
Township 4 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian in the city of Layton, Davis County, 
Utah. 
Such award should be made subject to the debt thereon, and 
Petitioner is ordered to hold harmless and defend Respondent from 
any non-payment. 
B. Respondent is awarded no equity in the marital 
residence. 
11. PERSONAL PROPERTY: The parties have acquired 
certain personal property during the term of the marriage. The 
Court will award the property that is currently in the possession 
of each party to that party except as hereafter noted. The Court 
finds that Petitioner has certain items of personal property that 
are Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the 
Respondent as soon as possible. Those items are the trophy 
baseball, a box of antique hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" 
on it, and a tricycle and wagon. In addition, Petitioner is to 
give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied. The 
Court notes that Respondent may have real property that was gifted 
to him by his family and will order that the Petitioner have no 
interest in any real property that he may own separately. The 
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Court awards to Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two 
automobiles. 
12. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties have acquired 
certain debts and obligations during the term of their marriage. 
Each party is ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred by 
them since the time of separation. Following the parties' 
separation in October 1996, Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39 
to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to 
Petitioner and for clothes purchased by Respondent's use. 
Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest 
accrued thereon which was $971.12 as of date of trial. In 
addition, the Court orders that Respondent be responsible for his 
student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred. 
13. TAX RETURNS FOR 1996 AND 1997: Each party will be 
responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns for 
the years 1996 and 1997. 
14. TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner is awarded the tax 
exemptions for the youngest child and the oldest child and 
Respondent is awarded the tax exemption for the middle child. 
15. PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS: The Court will issue a 
permanent mutual injunction against either party interfering with 
credit or accounts of the other party. Furthermore, the Court will 
issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party from 
harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other 
except for purposes of exercising visitation. 
16. CONTEMPT/JUDGMENT FOR DELINQUENT SUPPORT: 
Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent in the amount of 
$13,350.00 as and for past due alimony and child support through 
the month of January 1998. The Court having found that Respondent 
had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing 
basis and that he willfully violated the order of the Court hereby 
finds him in contempt. The Court will order that he spend five 
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days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on 
condition that he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the 
future. In addition, the Court will award some attorney's fees 
that will be calculated later. 
17. CONTEMPT RE VISITATION: Petitioner has an ongoing 
responsibility to provide Respondent with visitation with the minor 
children. The Court having found that Petitioner has willfully 
violated the order of the Court in this respect and that she denied 
visitation hereby finds her in contempt of Court and orders that 
she spend five days in the Davis County Jail. The Court will 
suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the 
orders of the Court in the future. 
18. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Petitioner is awarded judgment 
against Respondent in the amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees. 
19. RETIREMENT: As a result of the representations to 
the Court that neither party has any retirement benefits, no 
allocation of said retirement is necessary. 
20. PAST DUE MEDICAL EXPENSES: Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 
set forth $847.81 in child medical expenses as of date of trial. 
On June 29, 1998, Respondent paid to Petitioner the amount of 
$423.90 which represents full payment of Respondent's one-half of 
the medical expenses owed as of trial. 
21. SIGNING OF PAPERS: Each of the parties is ordered 
to cooperate in the execution of any documents necessary to 
finalize this order, or for property distribution, custody, 
visitation, and child support under the terms of the divorce 
decree. y ; 
DATED this / o day of July, 1998. 
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RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual, 
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this ^ <*W day of July, 1998. The undersigned 
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at 
the expiration of the appropriate time. 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 / ^ ? y , 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 /<&&^7 - ^ " x ^ ^ ^ S S*^ 
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